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ABSTRACT
On February 28, 2018, Dick’s Sporting Goods announced that it would no
longer sell long guns to eighteen- to twenty-year-olds. On March 8, 2018, Dick’s
was sued for violating the Michigan Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, which
prohibits discrimination on the basis of age in public accommodations. Dick’s
and Walmart were also sued for violating Oregon’s ban on age discrimination.
In addition to corporate liability under various state civil rights acts, directors
of Dick’s and Walmart face the threat of liability for breaching their fiduciary
duties – claims that may be much harder to defend than the more usual breach
of fiduciary duty claim.
Delaware corporation law has an underappreciated per se doctrine where
the board directs the corporation to violate the law. A knowing violation of
positive law is bad faith, which falls under the duty of loyalty. The business
judgment rule will not apply and exculpation will not be available under Section
102(b)(7). The shareholders may not even need to show harm.
This Article examines the relevant legal doctrine but also takes a step back
to consider what the rule should be from an ethical and moral standpoint. To do
so, rather than apply traditional corporate governance arguments, this Article
considers broader moral theories. In addition to the utilitarian calculus that is
so ubiquitous in corporate governance scholarship via the law and economics
movement, this Article considers the liberalism of both John Rawls and Robert
Nozick. But liberalism may seem less persuasive given the rise of illiberalism
politically on both the American Right and Left. Given the shift away from
liberalism, this Article also considers two non-liberal models: one a populist
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modification of Charles Taylor’s democratic communitarianism and the other
Catholic Social Thought.
Unsurprisingly, the proper rule depends on which moral theory is applied.
If that theory is liberalism (of either form covered), then a per se approach is
troubling. Harm to the corporation must be shown, and either the Delaware
legislature or the corporate players, depending on the form of liberalism, must
acquiesce to a per se rule. Counterintuitively, it is the per se rule that runs
against basic democratic norms. It gives the power to litigate in response to
harm, not to the party injured but to a third party. Given the divergent results
from applying different moral theories and given the democratic difficulty, the
Delaware legislature should clarify the standard. It will likely find that a harsh,
per se standard is unjustified.
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I. INTRODUCTION
What do Uber’s regulatory strategy, “legal” marijuana dispensaries,
Google’s handling of sexual harassment, and Dick’s Sporting Goods’ decision
to stop selling long guns to eighteen- to twenty-year-olds1 all have in
common? They all implicate business decisions that would be protected by
the business judgment rule but for an embedded violation of law. The
treatment of corporate violations of law at the board’s direction under
Delaware fiduciary obligation doctrine is an underappreciated topic. Rather
than the business judgment rule, such violations trigger a per se standard of
liability.
Negligence per se is “[n]egligence established as a matter of law, so that
breach of the duty is not a jury question,” usually arising “from a statutory
violation.”2 It is easier for a plaintiff to plead and prove a claim for negligence
where the negligence per se doctrine applies. An analogous per se doctrine
for another claim would have the same effect, including for claims more
difficult to plead and prove than negligence.3 A per se standard appears to
apply in corporate law to breach of fiduciary duty claims where the corporate
directors direct the corporation to violate positive law. Normally, the business
judgment rule largely insulates directors from liability for breach of fiduciary
duty absent a conflict of interest. One way to circumvent the business
judgment rule is by alleging the directors failed to properly monitor the
corporation under the rule laid out by the Delaware Court of Chancery in
Caremark.4 But a Caremark claim is “possibly the most difficult theory in
corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.”5 A
per se theory for breach of fiduciary duty for violating positive law, on the
other hand, raises the possibility of a much easier judgment to win.
This Article will consider when a violation of law is a breach of fiduciary
duty, whether and when it is a breach of fiduciary duty per se, and whether
such a breach is and should be subject to exculpation in a corporate charter.
A violation of positive law may be relevant in two contexts. The first, and
most straightforward, is where the board directed the corporation to violate
the law. The second is a failure to monitor claim under Caremark. This
1. See infra Part IV.
2. Negligence per se, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
3. Per se doctrines play a prominent role in antitrust law. See South Dakota v.
Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2091 (2018) (“State laws that discriminate against
interstate commerce face ‘a virtually per se rule of invalidity.’”) (quoting Granholm
v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 476 (2005)).
4. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 961(Del. Ch. 1996).
5. Id. at 967. That may be changing with recent decisions out of Delaware. See,
e.g., Marchland v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019); In re Clovis Oncology Inc.
Derivative Litig., No. 2017-0222-JRS, 2019 WL 4850188 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019).
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Article will also address relief, including the appropriateness of injunctive
relief and nominal damages where the violation of law maximizes shareholder
wealth but is socially detrimental. This Article will focus on Delaware law in
the corporate context (limited liability companies raise their own distinct
issues).
The possibility of liability for breach of fiduciary duty per se has
important moral and ethical implications. This Article will consider the
ethical implications after establishing the legal framework. The dominance
of law and economics in corporate and entity law makes utilitarianism the de
facto default ethical framework for examining corporate law issues. But as
this Article will show, utilitarianism is unsatisfactory and too limited for the
purposes of this scenario. This Article will also apply and consider both the
Rawlsian and Nozickian strains of liberalism. And given the recent turn away
from liberalism on both the American political Right and the American
political Left, this Article will look at the issue through the lenses of two nonliberal frameworks, Catholic Social Thought and a populist version of
democratic communitarianism.
Finally, this Article will consider various corporate lawbreaking
scenarios in light of these frameworks. Particular attention will be paid to
Dick’s Sporting Goods’ and Walmart’s corporate decisions to stop selling
firearms to eighteen- to twenty-year-olds, thus violating state law prohibitions
on age discrimination in public accommodations. After considering and
critiquing each moral theory in the context of examples of corporate
lawbreaking, the Article will conclude with a recommendation for how
fiduciary obligation law should regard “rogue” corporations.6

6. See Desimon v. Barrows, 924 A.3d 908, 934 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“Although
directors have wide authority to take lawful action on behalf of the corporation, they
have no authority knowingly to cause the corporation to become a rogue, exposing the
corporation to penalties from criminal and civil regulators.”) (emphasis added); see
also Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith
in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 633 (2010) (“When directors knowingly cause
the corporation to do what it may not – engage in unlawful acts or unlawful businesses
– they are disloyal to the corporation’s essential nature. By causing the corporation to
become a lawless rogue, they make the corporation untrue to itself and to the promise
underlying its own societally authorized birth.”) (emphasis added).
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II. LEGAL DOCTRINE
Corporations do not purely exist as a nexus of contracts.7 They are
creatures of statute, operating under statutory grants of authority.8 Despite the
modern, loose approach to those grants, they still operate to cabin corporate
actions.
Delaware law9 requires corporate directors exercise the same level of
care as “ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar
circumstances.”10 Despite the resemblance to the traditional negligence
standard, directors have almost never been held liable for breaches of
fiduciary duty under an ordinary negligence standard.11 Application of an
ordinary negligence standard is largely foreclosed for most board actions by
the business judgment rule.12 But if acts that violate law fall under the duty
of loyalty rather than the duty of care, then they would not fall under the
protection of the deferential business judgment rule.13
First, some history regarding the division of fiduciary duties in
Delaware: The Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor led to considerable speculation that there existed a “triad” of
7. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. OF FIN. ECON. 305,
311 (1976) (“The private corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction which
serves as a nexus for contracting relationships.”) (emphasis in original).
8. Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Disobedience, 68 DUKE L.J. 709, 719 (2019)
(citing Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good
Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 649 (2010)); cf. H. Justin Pace,
Contracting Out of Fiduciary Duties in LLCs: Delaware Will Lead, but Will Anyone
Follow?, 16 NEV. L.J. 1085, 1086 (2016) [hereinafter Pace, Waiver] (“The [LLC] form
is a product of statute, but the LLC is a creature of contract.”).
9. This paper will focus solely on Delaware law. But, given that many states
look to Delaware in developing their own corporation law, this issue is likely relevant
for many states.
10. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers, 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).
11. See Stephen M. Bainbridge et al., The Convergence of Good Faith and
Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559, 574–75 (2008) [hereinafter Bainbridge,
Convergence] (citing Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New
Trends in Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078,
1099 (1968)); 1 DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY
DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 167–72 (5th ed. 1998))).
12. See Bainbridge, Convergence, supra note 11, at 568 (“Courts generally
abstain from intervening in the affairs of corporate decisionmaking, typically by
invoking the business judgment rule.”).
13. See, e.g., S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 93, 129 (1979) (“Bad faith may preclude the business judgment defense where
directors knowingly violate a statute or comparable expression of public policy.”).
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fiduciary duties under Delaware corporation law – the traditional duties of
care and loyalty and, now, a duty of good faith.14 The Delaware Supreme
Court made clear in Stone v. Ritter, though, that the duty of good faith was a
component of the duty of loyalty rather than a separate, standalone fiduciary
duty.15 The addition of the duty of good faith expanded the scope of the duty
of loyalty. The duty of loyalty is no longer concerned solely with selfinterested transactions; now, the duty of loyalty is omnipresent because every
act by a fiduciary on the corporation’s behalf must have a proper corporate
purpose.16
Folding good faith into the duty of loyalty extends that duty to prohibit
not just self-interested actions but also to prohibit unlawful conduct. A
director must “exert all reasonable efforts” to protect the interests of the
corporation, but those efforts are narrowed: they must be lawful.17 In listing
the ways in which a board might fail to act in good faith, the Delaware
Supreme Court included “where the fiduciary acts with the intent to violate
applicable positive law.”18
Directors are fiduciaries of the corporation.19 When they act within a
proper corporate purpose, they act on behalf of the corporation. The
corporation has effectively delegated certain monitoring and decision-making
authority to the directors (acting collectively as part of the board). Thus, the
authority of the directors extends no further than the power of the corporation
to act. This is retired Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court Leo E.
Strine’s logic in characterizing corporate existence as being premised on a
“nondefeasible promise” to “conduct only lawful business through lawful
14. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (referencing
“the triads of [directors’] fiduciary duty – good faith, loyalty or due care”).
15. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006) (citing Guttman v. Huang,
823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003)).
16. Strine, supra note 6, at 636.
17. See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280
(Del. 1988) (“[C]orporate fiduciaries . . . must exert all reasonable and lawful efforts
to ensure that the corporation is not deprived of any advantage to which it is entitled.”)
(emphasis added) (relying on Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939)).
18. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006). The
other ways in which a board might fail to act in good faith are beyond the scope of
this article. See Bainbridge, Convergence, supra note 11, at 590–91 (criticizing the
Disney definition of good faith as threatening “to expand the extent to which courts
will review the substance of director decisions and, concomitantly, the liability
exposure of corporate directors”).
19. H. Justin Pace, What Equity, the Promise Economy, and Cognition Mean for
How Fiduciary Law Should Develop, 20 U. OF PA. J. OF BUS. L. 684, 701 (2018)
[hereinafter Pace, Equity] (citing Marhart, Inc. v. Calmat Co., Civ. A. No. 11,820,
1992 WL 82365 at *336 (Del. Ch. Apr. 22, 1992) (reported in 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 330
(1992)) (“Delaware directors are fiduciaries.”).
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activities.”20 The Delaware General Corporation Law is permissive, but it
limits corporations to “any lawful business or purpose.”21 A parallel can be
drawn with the requirement that contracts be formed for a lawful purpose to
be enforceable.
Defining a violation of law as bad faith would further seem to foreclose
a safe harbor for interested transactions. Under the Delaware statute, a
transaction is not voidable on the basis that it is interested if it is affirmed by
a majority of disinterested directors or by a majority of disinterested
shareholders.22 But the statute qualifies this by providing that the approval
must be in good faith.23 Strine suggests that the good faith qualification means
interested transactions that violate the law cannot be cleansed and thus are
always voidable.24 There is some logic to this in that violations of law fit
poorly with the directors’ duties to act in the best interest of the corporation.
But it stretches logic to assume that the Delaware legislature intended to treat
violations of law more harshly than the conflicted transactions that sit at the
heart of the duty of loyalty doctrine.

A. Section 102(b)(7)
Delaware’s division of the fiduciary duties owed by directors to the
corporation between the duties of loyalty and care is a distinction with a
difference. Violations of the duty of care may be exculpated in the corporate
charter under Delaware General Corporation Law Section 102(b)(7). Section
102(b)(7) endorses inclusion in a Delaware certificate of incorporation of a
“provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the
corporation or its shareholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary
duty as a director.”25 But it also sets limits on that power to exculpate directors
from liability for breach of their fiduciary duties. The certificate of
incorporation may not limit liability for “breach of the director’s duty of
loyalty.”26 Importantly for the purposes of this Article, Section 102(b)(7) also

20. Strine, supra note 6, at 651.
21. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2016) (emphasis added).
22. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2016). Section 144 only refers to disinterested
directors, making no such qualification for a shareholder vote. Fliegler v. Lawrence
nonetheless read such a qualification into the statute. 361 A.2d 218 (1976).
23. § 144.
24. Strine, supra note 6, at 657.
25. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2016).
26. § 102(b)(7)(i).
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prohibits limits on liability for “acts or omissions not in good faith or which
involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law.”27
The Delaware Court of Chancery has clarified the applicability of
Section 102(b)(7) by stating plainly that a violation of positive law violates
duty of good faith, itself a subset of the duty of loyalty.28 The Delaware
Supreme Court reiterated this in Stone v. Ritter.29 Thus, violations of positive
law would seem to not be exculpable. But Section 102(b)(7) also includes an
express carve out for a knowing failure to comply with the law.30 Placing
violations of law within the ambit of the duty of loyalty would then both create
a redundancy in Section 102(b)(7)31 and prevent exculpation for both knowing
and unknowing violations of the law, the former explicitly and the latter
implicitly.32 Corporations would also be barred from indemnifying directors
under these circumstances.33
27. § 102(b)(7)(ii). At least one member of the drafting committee thought the
good faith language, at least, was surplusage because he viewed a violation of good
faith as a violation of the duty of loyalty. Penn. Law, 102(b)(7) 22:08–24:05,
YOUTUBE (June 6, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wFxA2T-gEOU
[perma.cc/M3RY-S673].
28. Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. Ct. 2003) (“[O]ne
cannot act loyally as a corporate director by causing the corporation to violate the
positive laws it is obliged to obey.”); Metro Commc’n Corp. BVI v. Advanced
Mobilecomm Techs., 854 A.2d 121 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“Under Delaware law, a
fiduciary may not choose to manage an entity in an illegal fashion, even if the fiduciary
believes that the illegal activity will result in profits for the entity.”); In re Massey
Energy Co., C.A., No. 5430–VCS, 2011 WL 2176479, at *20 (May 31, 2011) (“[A]
fiduciary of a Delaware corporation cannot be loyal to a Delaware corporation by
knowingly causing it to seek profit by violating the law.”).
29. 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
30. § 102(b)(7)(ii).
31. But see Strine, supra note 6, at 660 (referencing “the reality that redundancy
is actually a pervasive presence in statutes and contracts, operating as a belt-andsuspenders protection against unintended consequences”).
32. But see id. at 652 n.69 (interpreting the “knowing” language as allowing
exculpation of unwitting violations); Bainbridge, Convergence, supra note 11, at 589–
90 (arguing that Section 102(b)(7) is “an internally contradictory botch job” that
should not be relied on to define good faith) (quoting Christopher M. Bruner, Good
Faith, State of Mind, and the Outer Boundaries of Director Liability in Corporate
Law, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1131, 1155 (2006)).
33. Hermelin v. K-V Pharm. Co., 54 A.3d 1093, 1111 (Del. Ch. 2012) (“Sections
145(a) and (b) of the DGCL permit a corporation to indemnify [a corporate officer or
director] so long as ‘the person acted in good faith and in a manner the person
reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation,
and, with respect to any criminal action or proceeding, had no reasonable cause to
believe the person’s conduct was unlawful.’”) (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a),
(b) (2016)).
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B. Open Questions
A knowing violation of law at the direction of the corporate board of
directors would seem straightforward, regardless of the issues raised above.
But while corporations frequently violate the law, it is rarer that they violate
the law at the direct instruction of the board.34 That specific scenario is the
focus of the ethical analysis in Part V, but there remain interesting, unresolved
legal questions. One example is when a failure by the board to monitor the
agents of the corporation in such a way as to prevent violations of positive law
breaches their fiduciary duties under Caremark. Failure to monitor falls under
the umbrella of good faith, and thus the duty of loyalty.35 Strine suggests that
a violation of positive law by the officers – or even just employees – of the
corporation could form the basis of a breach of fiduciary duty by the directors
for failure to monitor.36 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
applying Delaware precedent, held in In re Abbot Laboratories that directors
would be acting in bad faith if “the directors knew of the violations of law,
took no steps in an effort to prevent or remedy the situation, and that failure
to take any action for such an inordinate amount of time resulted in substantial
corporate losses.”37 The court characterized board behavior in that
circumstance as intentional.38 If this approach were adopted by the Delaware
courts, absent steps to prevent or remedy the situation, any violation of law
that the board knew about would fall under the per se rule, not the more usual,
exacting Caremark standard.
A Caremark claim is “possibly the most difficult theory in corporation
law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.”39 But what is

34. Cf. Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director’s Duty
of Attention: Time for Reality, 39 BUS. LAW. 1477, 1494 (1984) (noting that most
board time is devoted to “a continuing flow of supervisory process” not “affirmative
action on individual matters”).
35. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 695 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch.
1996) (indicating that a board must “exercise a good faith judgment that the
corporation’s information and reporting system is in concept and design adequate to
assure the board that appropriate information will come to its attention in a timely
manner as a matter of ordinary operations” to meet its duty).
36. Strine, supra note 6, at 686.
37. In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 809 (7th Cir.
2003). Although the court was technically applying Illinois law, the court examined
Delaware precedence because “Illinois case law follows Delaware law in establishing
demand futility requirements.” Id. at 803.
38. Id. at 809.
39. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967. The plaintiff will face a somewhat less difficult
task even where it can show the “board failed to oversee the company’s obligation to
comply with positive law” rather than simply mitigate business risk. In re Facebook,
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effectively a per se theory of fiduciary duty raises the possibility of a much
easier judgment to win. This stands in stark contrast with application of the
business judgment rule to duty of care claims, which has been compared to a
per se theory running in the other direction.40 Breach of fiduciary duty claims
under Delaware law in the corporate context could thus be arranged on a
continuum from the lightest to the heaviest burden for the plaintiff: violations
of law under the per se standard < interested transactions < Caremark failure
to monitor < normal business judgment.41
Also relevant is whether a failure to disclose a violation of positive law
is a breach of fiduciary duty.42 For both failure to monitor and failure to
disclose claims, it would seem that liability is not per se. Directors are not
strictly liable for the unlawful actions of every corporate agent.43 Nor must
the board disclose every violation of law by corporate agents acting on behalf
of the corporation.44 The directors need not, for example, disclose every
traffic ticket received by employees driving on company business.45
Another question is what exactly qualifies as “positive law” for these
purposes. Black’s Law Dictionary defines positive law as statutory or
regulatory law, as opposed to case law or moral law.46 Strine has
characterized the duty to comply with the law as “an obligation to be faithful
to the laws of the chartering society in exercising corporate powers.”47
Elsewhere, he has characterized it as loyalty “to the corporation’s basic
charter, a charter that precludes the corporation from pursuing profits by
Inc. Section 220 Litig., No. 2018-0661, 2019 WL 2320842, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 30,
2019).
40. Henry Ridgely Horsey, The Duty of Care Component of the Delaware
Business Judgment Rule, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 971, 977 (1994) (Prior to the mid-eighties
“the business judgment rule had been applied in such a manner as to constitute an
almost per se bar to shareholder claims of directors’ breach of their fiduciary duty of
care.”) (citing Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director’s Duty of Care: Judicial
Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX.
L. REV. 591, 594 (1983)).
41. A Caremark claim may be “possibly the most difficult theory in corporation
law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment,” In re Caremark Int’l.
Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d at 967. Also relevant is whether a failure to disclose a
violation of positive law is a breach of fiduciary duty. Id. It seems clear that liability
is not per se. Id. The directors need not, for example, disclose every traffic ticket
received by employees driving on company business. Id.
42. See, e.g., Metro Commc’n Corp. BVI v. Advanced Mobilcomm Techs. Inc.,
854 A.2d 121, 143 (Del. Ch. 2004).
43. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Positive Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
47. Strine, supra note 6, at 649 (emphasis added).
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illegal means.”48 Corporations are creatures of statute that exist by corporate
charter,49 but it is specifically a state corporate charter issued by a single state.
This could conceivably only obligate a director of a Delaware corporation to
follow Delaware law. The director would be free to direct the corporation to
violate New York law or California law or federal law. This seems at odds
with the language elsewhere, which neither expressly nor implicitly includes
such a limitation. What about foreign law? Is it a breach of fiduciary duty if
the board of Alphabet Inc. directs employees to “cheat” on the censored
version of its Google search engine that the Chinese government requires?50
Is a breach of fiduciary duty suit really the best place to litigate Airbnb’s
decision to delist rentals in Israel’s settlements in the West Bank?51 Strine’s
view would suggest that it is, and no limiting principle has as of yet developed
in the caselaw.
Chief Justice Strine has been dismissive of concerns about expanding
fiduciary obligation to cover violations of law, suggesting that it is of no
concern because in many cases no injury is caused and thus damages will not
be available.52 But injury may, of course, exist.53 More to the point, Delaware
courts have still awarded attorneys’ fees where a breach of fiduciary duty does
not result in measurable damages.54 The Delaware Court of Chancery has
48. Id. at 652.
49. Pollman, supra note 8, at 719 (citing Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core
Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 649
(2010)).
50. See Ryan Gallagher, Google Plans to Launch Censored Search Engine in
China, Leaked Documents Reveal, THE INTERCEPT (Aug. 1, 2018, 4:58 AM),
https://theintercept.com/2018/08/01/google-china-search-engine-censorship/
[perma.cc/5FFS-RFVR] (“Google is planning to launch a censored version of its
search engine in China that will blacklist websites and search terms about human
rights, democracy, religion, and peaceful protest . . . . The custom Android [search]
app . . . has already been demonstrated to the Chinese government.”).
51. The decision by Airbnb prompted a suit in response for discrimination under
Israeli law. Israeli Settler Sues Airbnb for Dropping West Bank Listings, JEWISH
TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY (Nov. 23, 2018, 6:42 AM), https://www.jta.org/2018/11/23/is
rael/israeli-settler-sues-airbnb-dropping-west-bank-listings [perma.cc/5HZT-U5Z8].
52. Strine, supra note 6, at 652 n.69.
53. An Oregon man sought $10,000 in compensatory and $1,000,000 in punitive
damages from Walmart for alleged violations of his civil rights under state law. Nick
Morgan, Man Denied Sale of Rifle by Dick’s and Walmart Seeks $1M, THE BULLETIN
(Aug. 11, 2018 11:12 AM), https://www.bendbulletin.com/nation/6443458-151/mandenied-sale-of-rifle-by-dicks-and [perma.cc/XV4N-TT84]; see also infra Part IV.4.
54. See, e.g., William Penn P’ship v. Saliba, 13 A.3d 749, 759 (Del. 2011)
(granting attorneys’ fee even though the plaintiffs “were left without a typical damage
award because the Court’s appraisal of the property came in at a value lower than the
sale price” because otherwise the plaintiffs “would have been penalized for bringing

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss1/5

12

Pace: Rogue Corporations

2020]

ROGUE CORPORATIONS

13

refused to award damages where the plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of
proof,55 but “the internal logic of Delaware law demands that the burden shift
to the defendant” after the plaintiff has proven breach.56 And harkening back
to the equitable roots of fiduciary obligation,57 Delaware courts may loosen
“normally stringent requirements of causation and damages when a breach of
the duty of loyalty is shown” due to “concerns of equity and deterrence.”58
The Delaware Supreme Court has stated that damages from a breach of
fiduciary duty should be calculated liberally.59 Certainty is not required.60
Nor is uncertainty to the defendant’s benefit – those uncertainties will be
resolved against the party that breached their duties.61 Even the availability
of only nominal damages could drive settlement for non-nominal amounts
where a claim has a very high likelihood of surviving motions to dismiss and
for summary judgment. And the Delaware Court of Chancery has broad
powers to fashion equitable remedies.62
Finally, tying corporate liability to violations of non-corporate law has
the potential to create political risk.63 That political risk can lead to increased
a successful claim against the [defendants] for breach of their fiduciary duty of
loyalty.”).
55. In re PLX Tech. Inc. Stockholders Litig., C.A. No. 9880-VCL, 2018 WL
5018535, at *56 (Del. Ch. Oct. 6, 2018).
56. Holger Spamann, PLX, Burden of Proof for Damages, and the Internal Logic
of Delaware Law, HARVARD L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOV. AND FIN. REG. (Nov. 30,
2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/11/30/plx-burden-of-proof-fordamages-and-the-internal-logic-of-delaware-law/ [perma.cc/YN8F-4399].
57. See Pace, Equity, supra note 19, at 687–91 (detailing the equitable roots of
fiduciary law).
58. CertiSign Holding, Inc. v. Kulikovsky, C.A. No. 12055-JRS, slip op. at 77
(Del. Ch. June 7, 2018) (citing In re Primedia Inc. Deriv. Litig., 910 A.2d 248, 262
(Del. Ch. 2006)).
59. Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., 676 A.2d 436, 444 (Del. 1996).
60. Basho Techs. Holdco B, LLC v. Georgetown Basho Investors, LLC, C.A.
No. 11802-VCL, slip op. at 123 (Del. Ch., July 6, 2018).
61. Id. at 124 (“[U]certainties in awarding damages are generally resolved
against the wrongdoer.”).
62. See, e.g., In re Oxbow Carbon LLC Unitholder Litig., C.A. no. 12447-VCL,
slip op. at 4–27 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 2018) (discussing the court’s equitable powers at
length).
63. For example, an SEC commissioner “berated Citigroup Inc. executives in a
private meeting over the bank’s decision to curtail some of the business it does with
companies that sell guns.” Robert Schmidt, Senators Seek Probe of SEC Member Who
Assailed
Citi’s
Gun
Stance,
BLOOMBERG
(June
13,
2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-13/senators-seek-probe-of-secmember-who-assailed-citi-s-gun-stance [perma.cc/9UTP-RHZS]. Of course, the
implications of changes to policies related to the sale of firearms go beyond potential
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damages. The Governor of Florida has responded to Airbnb delisting rentals
in Israel’s settlements in the West Bank by ordering that the state stop
reimbursements to state employees for stays through Airbnb while on official
state business.64 Airbnb’s decision in other circumstances would be protected
by the business judgment rule, but because it may violate Florida65 and
Israeli66 law, Airbnb may now be liable for damages not just from a settlement
or verdict in any lawsuit but from other consequences such as the loss of
revenues from employees of the third-largest state in the United States
traveling on official business.67 This would be true even if Airbnb’s actions
do not violate Florida law.68 Implications of the applicable rule, though, are
as much ethical as they are legal.

III. ETHICAL FRAMEWORK
A per se rule for violations of positive law implicates broader principles.
It implicates, for example, the tension between fiduciary obligation’s
equitable roots and its modern statutory and contractual form.69 But it also
implicates broader democratic norms.
The existing scholarship on fiduciary liability for corporate violations of
law takes a narrower approach.70 Rather than examine this issue directly
through the lens of more common approaches in the corporate governance
scholarship, this Article will instead examine it through political theory
models. There is utility in stepping back and looking at a problem through a
new lens: it allows us to judge those models against first principles. To the
extent that Americans have in significant numbers rejected the old liberal
order, it is fruitful to consider ethical frameworks other than those that provide
the philosophical foundation for the free-market conservatism of the modern

liability for aiding and abetting violations of prohibitions of age discrimination in
public accommodations under state law. See infra Part IV.4.
64. Letter from Governor Ron DeSantis to David Clark (Jan. 15, 2019),
https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/DMS-Letter.pdf
[perma.cc/FB2A-LZJU].
65. Id.
66. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
67. Letter from Governor Ron DeSantis to David Clark, supra note 64.
68. Id.
69. See generally, Pace, Equity, supra note 19 (discussing the tension both in the
historical development of fiduciary obligation law and in the scholarly literature).
70. See, e.g., Strine, supra note 6; Pollman, supra note 8; Bainbridge,
Convergence, supra note 11; Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in
Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2006); Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate
Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (2005).
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American Right71 and the egalitarian liberalism of the modern American
Left.72 Conversely, applying theoretical models to concrete issues helps test
the usefulness and correctness of those models.73
Why five models rather than just one, superior model? For a rule to be
just, it must meet some standard of substantive correctness.74 If multiple
separate models of political theory each have significant flaws, then using
only one model is more likely to lead to rules that are substantively incorrect.
As this Article will show, each of the five models discussed below have fatal
flaws. And if multiple separate political theory models tend to reach the same
results, then they provide an analytic check on each other. Because political
theory models can include errors and can be misapplied, the likelihood of a
conclusion being optimal is higher where more than one theory supports it.75
But where the application of multiple theories leads to different results, we
must reconsider any single conclusion and give serious consideration to how
to resolve the split.76 I will return to the issue of how to resolve that split after
demonstrating that applying the five below models to the issue at hand leads
to divergent conclusions.77

71. See Thomas Nagel, Foreword to ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND
UTOPIA xvi (1974) (pointing toward Anarchy, State, and Utopia as providing the
“libertarian element . . . of the ideology of modern conservatism” and “free-market
conservatism” with “a philosophical foundation”).
72. See id. (pointing toward John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin as providing
“egalitarian liberalism” with a philosophical foundation).
73. Cf. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 11
(Dover 2006) (“I cannot stand forward, and give praise or blame to anything which
relates to human actions and human concerns, on a simple view of the object as it
stands stripped of every relation, in all the nakedness and solitude of metaphysical
abstraction.”).
74. Cf. Randy E. Barnett, The Virtues of Redundancy in Legal Thought, 33 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 153, 153 (1990) (“By ‘justice,’ I mean the correctness of the end or results
of a legal system . . . . Put another way, justice is the substantive correctness of a legal
decision.”).
75. Cf. id. at 154–55 (“The greater the number of different sound methods of
evaluation that converge on a single conclusion, the more confident we can be in that
conclusion.”).
76. Cf. id. at 155 (“Conversely, a conflict between competing sound modes of
analysis over a particular conclusion should lessen our confidence in it and motivate
us to search for a better approach.”).
77. See infra Part V.
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A. Utilitarianism
The orthodox approach, in implication if not expression, in business law
scholarship over the last several decades has been utilitarianism.78
Utilitarianism is rooted in the work of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.79
Under this view, the best rule maximizes happiness by producing “the greatest
possible surplus of pleasure over pain.”80 An action is “right” if it tends to
promote happiness and more right the more it promotes happiness; an action
is “wrong” if it “tends to produce the reverse of happiness” and more wrong
the more it does so.81 Corporate governance literature essentially defines
happiness as maximizing overall economic value.82 With caveats, this
approach has much to commend it. The problem is not so much that the
economics are off as that some of the underlying assumptions are
unsupportable.
Utilitarianism would seem to accept any action that resulted in greater
overall economic value. Under utilitarianism, then, efficient breach is not
unjust. This is uncontroversial, at least within the scholarship and the law.
Parties are free to breach a contract so long as they pay damages.
Utilitarianism does not strictly require the latter;83 justice does. In the context
of positive law, utilitarianism would seem to justify violating the law so long
as the benefit – whether to the actor or more broadly – exceeded the harm.

78. See Martin H. Redish & Clifford W. Berlow, The Class Action as Political
Theory, 85 WASH. L. REV. 753, 786–87 n.142 (2007) (“Bentham is recognized in some
circles as ‘the parent of economic analysis of law.’”) (quoting Cass R. Sunstein,
Animal Welfare and Economic Analysis, THE FACULTY BLOG (April 18, 2006),
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2006/04/animal_welfare_.html
[perma.cc/VLQ7-UMZ8]); see also Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring
Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1385, 1387 (2008) (referring to
utilitarianism as “corporate law’s implicit moral theory”)
79. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION (1789); JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1789); see also Ronald
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK
& DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (Harvard
Univ. Press 1996).
80. HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 413 (1874).
81. MILL, supra note 79, at 10.
82. See Coase, supra note 79; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 79.
83. Cf. Matt Zwolinski, The Separateness of Persons and Liberal Theory, 42 THE
J. OF VALUE INQUIRY 147, 149 (2008) (“For a utilitarian, there is no essential
difference between one person’s utility and another’s.”).
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This view justifies theft so long as the first party valued the object of the theft
more highly than the second party valued it.84
The answer to that problem is that utilitarian calculus should not focus
on individual acts (act-utilitarianism). Rather, the focus should be on the
utility of rules (rule-utilitarianism).85 The rule-utilitarian examines the benefit
to a society of a given rule at the aggregate level, and instead of examining
the utility of each act violating the rule, condemns all violations of a rule
deemed beneficial.86 But arguably, this distinction is both artificial and not in
line with the traditional conception of utilitarianism.87 And an ethical
framework that does not tell us when we can break rules is of limited value.
Two rules might be beneficial to society: “directors should act to maximize
the economic return to the corporation’s shareholders” and “directors should
ensure that the corporation operates in compliance with the law.” A useful
ethical framework should give us a way to resolve contradictions between the
two. And while rule-utilitarianism avoids stamping its approval on some
pernicious behavior, such as the theft mentioned above, it does not save us

84. “Question. What if I see something that I wanna take and it belongs to
someone else?”
“Then you will be arrested.”
“But what if I want it more than the person who has it?”
“Still illegal.”
“That doesn’t follow. No, I want it more.”
GUARDIANS OF THE GALAXY (Marvel Studios 2014). Scholars have even gone so far
as to argue that utilitarian and other consequentialist models could lead to justifying
rape, murder, and genocide. Eyal Zamir & Barak Medina, Law, Morality, and
Economics: Integrating Moral Constraints with Economic Analysis of the Law, 96
CAL. L.R. 323, 333 (2008) (citing Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in
J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM – FOR AND AGAINST 105
(1973); David Dolinko, The Perils of Welfare Economics, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 351,
356–62 (2002); John C. Harsanyi, Problems with Act-Utilitarianism and Malevolent
Preferences, in HARE AND CRITICS 89, 96 (Douglas Seanor & N. Fotion eds., 1988)).
85. KAREN LEBACQZ, SIX THEORIES OF JUSTICE: PERSPECTIVES FROM
PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL ETHICS 23 (Augsburg Publishing House 1986).
See also Bruner, supra note 78, at 1428 (defining act- and rule- utilitarianism).
According to Redish and Berlow, there is “a seemingly limitless variety of nuanced
approaches to [utilitarian] theory.” Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 771.
86. Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 771.
87. Id. (“Bentham and Mill made no distinctions at all between ‘act-’ and ‘rule-’
utilitarianism.”); see also Bruner, supra note 78, at 1429 (“Philosopher David Lyons
has argued that act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism, upon close inspection, are
‘extensionally equivalent.’” (relying on DAVID LYONS, FORMS AND LIMITS OF
UTILITARIANISM 62–197 (1965))).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020

17

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 5

18

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

from the possibility of a need “that we all be sacrificed in the monster’s maw,
in order to increase total utility.”88
Utilitarianism presents another serious problem: it is frequently too hard
to calculate the change in utility that will result from a given rule change, or
even calculate with any accuracy the likelihood of a given change in utility.
This invariably leads to justifying a policy change that fits one’s priors by
claiming that it will increase utility. But because the change in utility is not
easily susceptible to accurate calculation, this means moving away from
rigorous analysis of policy choices, not toward the sort of rigorous analysis
we find desirable. All theories will necessarily consider some form of
utilitarian calculus when an accurate calculation is available and rights have
been determined and incorporated. The advantage of other theories is that
they provide rules that are useful when an accurate calculation is not available.
Utilitarianism, though, must be considered first because it looms large
over every other ethical model. For all its weaknesses, utilitarianism is
persuasive enough at least that every other model must take into account
changes to overall utility.

B. Liberalism
Fiduciary obligation has long been viewed through a moral lens rather
than an economic lens.89 Or to put it another way, relying on Kant’s liberalism
rather than utilitarianism,90 people must be treated as ends, not merely as
means to an end.91 Central to liberalism is the individual and the rights of the
88. NOZICK, supra note 71, at 41 (“Utilitarian theory is embarrassed by the
possibility of utility monsters who get enormously greater gains in utility from any
sacrifice of others than these others lose. For, unacceptably, the theory seems to
require that we all be sacrificed in the monster’s maw, in order to increase total
utility.”).
89. See, e.g., Pace, Equity, supra note 19, at 701–06 (summarizing and critiquing
“traditionalist” views of fiduciary obligation).
90. The line between utilitarianism and liberalism is fuzzy. John Stuart Mill’s
“more instrumental justification of liberalism” straddles the line. Redish & Berlow,
supra note 78, at 764 (citing JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 63 (1859)). But
utilitarianism’s basic framing of individuals as means rather than ends separates it
from liberalism. See Zwolinski, supra note 83, at 152 (discussing Kantian critiques of
utilitarianism by Nozick and Rawls on this basis).
91. Stakeholder theory has a Kantian foundation. See, e.g., R. Edward Freeman
& John McVea, A Stakeholder Approach to Strategic Management, in BLACKWELL
HANDBOOK OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 17 (M. Hitt, E. Freeman & J. Harrison, eds.
2001) (describing the justification for the stakeholder theory as rooted in Kantian
principles because it argued that “managers should make corporate decisions
respecting shareholders’ well-being rather than treating them as means to a corporate
end”) (emphasis in original). Catholic Social Thought also takes the position that
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individual. Most definitions of liberalism “recognize the centrality of some
form of individual autonomy.”92 Per Northwestern Law Professor Martin
Redish, “autonomy dictates a significant level of free choice for the individual
on issues of some consequence to him, unfettered by coercive external forces,
either governmental or private.”93 Liberalism is arguably the most important
philosophical foundation for U.S. law. Let us, then, consider two important
strains of liberalism: John Rawls’ Theory of Justice94 and Robert Nozick’s
Entitlement Theory.95

1. John Rawls’ Theory of Justice
Rawls and Nozick have very different visions of what liberalism
requires. While Nozick sees liberalism as requiring substantive autonomy be
protected, Rawls rejects utilitarianism,96 but otherwise takes a looser view.97
Redish has characterized Rawls as focusing on protecting not substantive
autonomy but instead process-based autonomy; that is, “the ability of
individuals to control the nature of their participation in the processes of
collective democratic government.”98 Public positions and offices, for
example, must be open to all under Rawls’ view. Substantive autonomy, on
the other hand, “refers to the more general power of individuals to make
decisions directing the course of their lives.”99 Substantive autonomy
includes a right to actions that negatively affect the interests of others so long
as their rights are not infringed.100 To Nozick, on the other hand, procedural
protections are necessary but not sufficient.101
people, especially workers, must be treated as an ends, not as a means. See, e.g.,
Laborem Exercens ¶ 7 (1981).
92. Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 764.
93. Id.
94. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Belknap Press revised ed. 1999).
According to Nozick himself, “[p]olitical philosophers must either work within
Rawls’ theory or explain why not.” NOZICK, supra note 71, at 183.
95. NOZICK, supra note 71, at 183.
96. See RAWLS, supra note 94, at 3 (“Justice . . . does not allow that the sacrifices
imposed on a few are outweighed by the larger sum of advantages enjoyed by many.”).
97. Id.
98. Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 765.
99. Id. at 765.
100. Id. (“[S]ubstantive liberty . . . may extend . . . to also include individual
decisions that simultaneously impact the interests of other members of society, such
as whether to sell automatic weapons.”).
101. NOZICK, supra note 71, at 31 (“There is no side constraint on how we may
use a tool . . . . There are procedures to be followed . . . . But there is no limit on what
we may do to it to best achieve our goals.”).
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Rawls structured his Theory of Justice around “justice as fairness.”102
Rawls argued that we can only rationally choose how to structure a just society
from the “original position” behind a “veil of ignorance.”103 Parties choosing
principles from behind the veil of ignorance “do not know what position they
hold in society.”104 An individual in such a situation has an incentive to
arrange society in the fairest manner possible. Rawls derived from this his
“First Principle, which requires that individuals be given as much liberty as
possible so long as each member of society enjoys the same degree of
liberty.”105 Rawls’ Second Principle requires that inequalities resulting from
state intervention “be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members
of society; and they are to be attached to positions and offices open to all,
under conditions of equality of opportunity.”106 Inequalities tie in with the
“problem of distributive social justice,” which concerns how the benefits of
societal cooperation should be distributed and allocated.107 Rawls did not take
an absolutist view of inequality; rather, he argued that both social inequality
and economic inequality could be just, but only if those inequalities “result in
compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged
members of society.”108
Rawls’ version of liberalism has two basic and insurmountable
problems: transaction costs and aggregate wealth. Rawls did not take into
account transaction costs. Even if we might, behind the veil of ignorance,
choose to arrange our affairs in a different manner, we may rationally choose
not to rearrange our affairs in that manner in reality. Not because of
oppression or self-interest, but because both the costs of change and the
inevitable risk associated with it – the transaction costs – would be too high.109
And as Nozick explains, any patterned principle of distribution requires

102. See LEBACQZ, supra note 85, at 33 (rooting “justice as fairness” in “the social
contract theories of Locke and Rosseau, and the deontology of Kant”).
103. Id. at 34; Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 766.
104. See LEBACQZ, supra note 85, at 34.
105. Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 766. (internal citations omitted).
106. Id. (internal citations omitted).
107. NOZICK, supra note 71, at 184.
108. RAWLS, supra note 94, at 13 (emphasis added).
109. Cf. STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE 184 (Penguin
Books 2011) (“According to Burke, no mortal is smart enough to design a society
from first principles. A society is an organic system that develops spontaneously,
governed by myriad interactions and adjustments that no human mind can pretend to
understand. Just because we cannot capture its workings in verbal propositions does
not mean it should be scrapped and reinvented according to the fashionable theories
of the day. Such ham-fisted tinkering will only lead to unintended consequences,
culminating in violent chaos.”).
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repeated violations of individual property rights because it is not selfperpetuating.110
The other fatal flaw to Rawlsian liberalism is that it focuses on an
arrangement to the benefit of the “least of these” to the exclusion of
considerations of absolute wealth. Transactions that create value and thus
increase absolute wealth are enormously beneficial. Such transactions have
lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty in the last several
decades.111 To be sure, Rawls did “argue that inequalities are justified if they
serve to raise the position of the worst-off group in the society, if without the
inequalities the worst-off group would be even more worse off.”112 But a
transaction that benefits the wealthy but does not benefit nor hurt the poor is,
all else equal, beneficial to society.113 The focus on “the least of these” also
does not give useful guidance on any number of issues, including this one.114
Rawls paid limited attention to when violations of law are justified.
Under Rawls’ view, an unjust law must be changed,115 not necessarily
disobeyed. We are to comply with just laws,116 although that does not answer
the question of the appropriate liability standard for corporate directors. For
unjust laws, Rawls not only departed from the view that we have an obligation
to disobey them, but also argued we, at least sometimes, have an obligation to
obey them.117 This may be a matter of semantics, though, as this obligation
110. NOZICK, supra note 71, at 167–74.
111. See, e.g., ANGUS DEATON, THE GREAT ESCAPE: HEALTH, WEALTH, AND THE
ORIGINS OF INEQUALITY 160 (Princeton University Press 2013) (“[T]he rapid growth
of average incomes, particularly in China and India, and particularly after 1975, did
much to reduce extreme poverty in the world. In China most of all, but also in India,
the escape of hundreds of millions from traditional and long-established poverty
qualifies as the greatest escape of all.”); see also Caritas in veritate ¶ 21 (2009)
(“[G]rowth . . . continues to be a positive factor that has lifted billions of people out
of misery.”).
112. NOZICK, supra note 71, at 188; but see RAWLS, supra note 94, at 13 (“Offhand
it hardly seems like that person who view themselves as equals, entitled to press their
claims upon one another, would agree to a principle which may require lesser life
prospects for some simply for the sake of a greater sum of advantages enjoyed by
others.”). Rawls’ discussion of efficiency seems to suggest that he doesn’t necessarily
see such transactions as beneficial. RAWLS, supra note 94, at 60; but see id. at 72
(indicating that, once welfare has been maximized for the worst-off representative, the
next step is to maximize welfare for the second worst-off representative man).
113. See NOZICK, supra note 71, at 188.
114. See id.
115. Id. at 3.
116. Id. at 308.
117. RAWLS, supra note 94, at 308 (“Now it is sometimes said that we are never
required to comply in these cases. But this is a mistake. The injustice of a law is not,
in general, a sufficient reason for not adhering to it.”).
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does not hold for laws that “exceed certain limits of injustice.”118 Rawls
viewed compliance with unjust laws as necessary for a functioning society.119
He even went so far as to argue that civil disobedience might not be justified
in a society that oppresses many minority groups because it could create
“serious disorder,” which might lead “to a breakdown in the respect for law
and the constitution, thereby setting in motion consequences unfortunate for
all.”120 Where disobedience to the law is justified, though, courts should take
that into account in reducing or suspending punishment.121
Redish associates Rawls and Nozick with process-based and substantive
autonomy, respectively,122 and he concludes that, per either Rawls or Nozick,
liberal democracy “requires that individuals be autonomous when
participating in governmental processes and seeking to influence the decisions
of democratic institutions.”123 In analyzing corporate law, this Article will
view Rawlsian liberalism through the lens of Redish’s focus on the
importance of process-based autonomy and democratic norms, a focus that is
particularly useful for examining the appropriateness of a per se rule. Now,
though, we turn to the scholar whom Redish contrasts with Rawls – Robert
Nozick.

2. Robert Nozick’s Entitlement Theory
Nozick’s version of liberalism more readily fits into John Stuart Mill’s
harm principle: power can only be exercised over a person “to prevent harm
for others,” not for “[h]is own good, either physical or moral.”124 Mill’s harm
principle, of course, raises a question of its own: How do we determine harm
to others? Is this a question for the courts or for the legislature?
Under Nozick’s Entitlement Theory, people are entitled to holdings that
they obtain in accordance with the principles of justice in acquisition and
118. Id.; see also id. at 309 (“[I]t is evident that our duty or obligation to accept
existing arrangements may sometimes be overridden. . . . Unjust laws do not all stand
on a par.”); Id. at 310 (“[O]nly a few [writers] think that any deviation from justice,
however small, nullifies the duty to comply with existing rules.”); Id. at 314 (“A law
or policy is sufficiently just, or at least not unjust, if when we try to imagine how the
ideal procedure would work out, we conclude that most persons taking part in this
procedure and carrying out its stipulations would favor the law or policy.”).
119. See id. at 312 (“Without some recognition of this duty mutual trust and
confidence are liable to break down.”).
120. Id. at 328.
121. Id. at 339.
122. Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 767 (noting that “Nozick and Rawls failed
explicitly to recognize the process-based/substantive dichotomy”).
123. Id.
124. MILL, supra note 90, at 91.
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justice in transfer.125 That is, people have a right to property obtained in a just
fashion, and they have the right to dispense that property.126 Because people
only have a right to what they acquire justly, provisions must also be made for
remedying holdings acquired unjustly.127
Nozick relied heavily on “the Kantian principle that individuals are ends
and not merely means.”128 This means that individuals “may not be sacrificed
or used for the achieving of other ends without their consent. Individuals are
inviolable.”129 Individual rights may be violated only if “prior consent is
impossible or very costly to negotiate,” but full compensation must be paid
regardless.130 Under this Principle of Compensation, compensation must be
paid both for the “border crossings” just mentioned and for a ban on action
that infringes on individual liberty by robbing individuals of the “freedom to
act.”131 This leads to protections for what Redish terms “substantive
autonomy”: “the more general power of individuals to make decisions
directing the course of their lives.”132 This is hardly a radical view in theory,
but it is extraordinarily strict in application.
Nozick’s view focuses on the individual, and in doing so, he rejects the
notion of a social good divorced from individuals.133 Social entities do not
have interests that demand consideration; only individuals do.134 Nozick was
concerned that talk of the social good would provide cover for the use of
individuals as means rather than ends.135 This led Nozick to the conclusion
that only what he termed the minimal state – a very minimal state – can be
morally justified because “[a]ny state more extensive violates people’s
rights.”136
Only the minimal state can be justified because the rights of an
association are limited to “the sum of the individual rights that its members or
clients transfer to the association.”137 This would logically extend to
corporations. Shareholders cannot give the corporation any rights they do not
125. NOZICK, supra note 71, at 151.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 152–53.
128. Id. at 30–31.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 72.
131. LEBACQZ, supra note 85, at 53.
132. Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 765.
133. See generally NOZICK, supra note 71.
134. Id. at 32–33 (“[T]here is no social entity with a good that undergoes some
sacrifice for its own good. There are only individual people, different individual
people, with their own individual lives.”).
135. Id. at 34.
136. Id. at 149.
137. Id. at 89.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020

23

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 5

24

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

possess,138 and the state cannot give the corporation any additional rights
because it, too, has no more rights or powers than the individuals associated
with it. Proponents of concession theory argue that the corporation is
fundamentally a state creation, and thus “the state has the right to regulate its
creation as it sees fit.”139 Nozick would reject this view to the extent that it
would give the state power to regulate the corporation beyond the (very
limited) power it has to regulate individuals.
But Nozick’s Entitlement Theory has its own problems. Nozick’s
absolutist view regarding the infringement of individual rights makes the
entire modern corporate economy, built on limited liability, suspect. Limited
liability is, after all, an artificial, state-imposed limit on redress for
infringement of individual rights. Nozick recognized just that: he argued that
a corporation should be free to contract for limited liability, but that its tort
liability must be unlimited.140 But this dragoons in persons who are not
tortfeasors merely because they have an interest in an association. To the
extent the corporation is a tortfeasor, it makes perfect sense that the entirety
of its assets be at stake. To the extent an individual is a tortfeasor, it makes
perfect sense that the entirety of the individual’s assets be at stake. And that
is just the case under modern limited liability. An individual is always
responsible – and liable – for their own acts. It does not follow that buying a
share of the residual income of the corporation should open the buyer to
potentially unlimited liability. That would seem to violate Nozick’s own
principles. Under Nozick’s view, no greater body can have any rights that the
individuals that comprise it do not possess.141 He evidently sees limited
liability as violating this principle. But, in fact, it does not. It effectively
retains an active participant-passive investor distinction that roughly maps to
who caused harm by infringing on the rights of an individual.
Nozick’s minimal state is almost certainly impractical. Even if it is not,
it is so tremendously dissimilar to the state as it exists today that we run into
an issue similar to that which we ran into with Rawls. The change to a
minimal state would be so drastic that not just Burkean conservatives, highly
concerned with the risk and cost of change, would blanche at the prospect. A
relatively well functioning system should not “be scrapped and reinvented
138. Cf. Daniel T. Ostas, Cooperate, Comply, or Evade?: A Corporate Executive’s
Social Responsibilities with Regard to Law, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 559, 591 (2004)
[hereinafter Ostas, Cooperate, Comply, or Evade?] (arguing shareholders have “no
moral authority to authorize the CEO to do anything that [a sole] proprietor could not
ethically do.”).
139. Stefan J. Padfield, Corporate Social Responsibility & Concession Theory, 6
WILLIAM & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1, 20 (2015) (citing Stephen Padfield, Rehabilitating
Concession Theory, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 327, 333 (2014)).
140. NOZICK, supra note 71, at 133–34.
141. See id.
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according to the fashionable theories of the day.”142 More directly relevant,
the tremendous dissimilarity between our state and a minimal state makes it
very difficult to use Nozick’s work to meaningfully distinguish between
government interventions: almost all will fail to pass muster. While liberalism
provides valuable insights into a per se rule for violations of positive law, it is
not perfect nor is it the only perspective worth discussing.

C. Communitarian Models
Given the rise of populism and illiberalism in the United States (both on
the political right and on the political left),143 there is value in considering
perspectives other than liberalism. The rise of populism and illiberalism may
be due in part to a class bias associated with reliance on liberalism. Nonliberal models other than utilitarianism may also be underappreciated due to
both the prevalence of utilitarianism in corporate scholarship and a class bias
toward liberalism. In particular, a focus on liberal individualism may
obfuscate the dangers of a breakdown in civil society, something toward
which communitarianism is better orientated. Given those concerns, this
Section will also consider two communitarian models. The first is a populist
modification of Charles Taylor’s democratic communitarianism.144 The
second is Catholic Social Thought.

142. PINKER, supra note 109, at 184 (describing Burke’s philosophy).
143. See, e.g., Fareed Zakaria, Opinion: America’s Democracy has Become
Illiberal,
THE
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
29,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/america-is-becoming-a-land-of-less-liber
ty/2016/12/29/2a91744c-ce09-11e6-a747-d03044780a02_story.html?utm_term=.947
049d8545a [perma.cc/7C5X-AEN7] (arguing that the “liberty and law” half of liberal
democracy is, in the United States and abroad, “vanishing, leaving just the outer,
democratic shell”). Senator Elizabeth Warren has proposed reforms that would create
criminal culpability for executives of large corporations who “negligently permit or
fail to prevent” violations of law by the corporation and would require executives of
very large corporations to certify that no lawbreaking was occurring in the company.
Kevin LaCroix, Senator Warren’s Proposed Executive Liability Legislation is
24,
2019),
Contrary
to
Legal
Traditions,
D&O BLOG (Apr.
https://www.dandodiary.com/2019/04/articles/director-and-officer-liability/senatorwarrens-proposed-executive-liability-legislation-is-contrary-to-our-legal-systemsprinciples/ [perma.cc/ZP66-NHHS].
144. See Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 774–75 (providing the label and
associating it with Charles Taylor).
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1. Populist Communitarianism
Proponents of communitarianism see liberalism as overemphasizing
individualism at the expense of the community as a whole.145 Democratic
communitarianism elevates “the social institutions that shape the community
as a whole” above “the value of individual autonomy.”146 Democratic
communitarianism, unlike utilitarianism, shares with liberalism “a
commitment to a foundational premise of societal self-determination.”147 But
under this view, we can only be free by shaping our society “through
instruments of common decision.”148 Paradoxically, it is coming together to
decide how we bind ourselves that “is an essential part of the exercise of
freedom.”149
The individual is no longer the “foundational democratic unit,” as with
liberalism; under democratic communitarianism, it is the community as a
whole.150 The idea that “society is best served by political decisions that
reflect the preferences of the entire community”151 is closely related to the
conception of virtue theory in business ethics, which sees managers as owing
duties to society as a whole.152 It is unclear, though, that “society as a whole”
is the appropriate definition of “community” even for communitarianism.
Democratic communitarians believe that the state can best serve the interests
of society by adopting policies designed to promote human interaction as a
part of broader society.153 That interaction largely takes place not in some
abstract “community as a whole” but rather through smaller communal
entities. Given that, the “community as a whole” is of limited utility. A large
assortment of smaller communal entities serve an even greater role in shaping
an individual’s identity, and the shaping of identity is to a great degree driven
by individual choices.

145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 774.
Id.
Id.
CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES: PHILOSOPHICAL
PAPERS VOL. 2 187, 208 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1985).
149. Id.
150. Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 775.
151. Id. at 774; see also TAYLOR, supra note 148, at 208 (asserting that certain
issues “can only be effectively decided by society as a whole”).
152. See Timothy L. Fort, Goldilocks & Bus. Ethics: A Paradigm That Fits “Just
Right”, 23 J. CORP. L. 245, 247 (1998) [hereinafter Fort, Goldilocks] (characterizing
communitarian theories as “the necessary partners of virtue theory”).
153. Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 775; see also TAYLOR, supra note 148,
at 205 (arguing that individuals only acquire their identities by interacting with other
humans as part of a broader society).
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Democratic communitarianism only supports protecting individual
autonomy if doing so does not undermine communal attachments, which
democratic communitarians see as so important to shaping choices by
individuals.154 Democratic communitarians believe that laws should promote
communal attachments rather than atomistic individual autonomy.155 It
follows logically, then, that laws should not discourage communal
attachments. Laws that “crowd out” civil society are to be assiduously
avoided.
Democratic communitarians shy from atomistic individual autonomy
because they see “an individual’s identity as bound up with each person’s
various communal attachments.”156 But if “living in society is a necessary
condition of the development of rationality . . . or of becoming a fully
responsible, autonomous being,”157 responsible, autonomous beings are a
necessary condition for building a full society. It is not clear that democratic
communitarians appreciate the extent to which individuals and their
individual choices are necessary to forming the smaller communal entities that
make up civil society.
Additionally, there is a tension between democratic communitarianism
and pluralism. We may have “a significant obligation to belong,”158 but what
if we do not want to belong? Democratic communitarianism ought to, at the
very least, accept that people will want to change the small communal entities
to which they belong, and in a free society, they must be permitted to do so.
The irony in Taylor’s arguments against “atomism” is that it is individual
freedom that best facilitates community building.159
Taylor takes a pinched view of the communal entities that shape
individual identity. He focuses not on the smaller communal entities that
allow a pluralistic society to thrive, and are arguably more important to civic
society, but rather on the “bearers of our culture [such as] museums,
symphony orchestras, universities, laboratories, political parties, law courts,
representative assemblies, newspapers, publishing houses, television stations,
and so on.”160 Churches, trade unions, and local Rotary Clubs are nowhere to
be found. Taylor’s communitarianism is a community by and for elites.

154. Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 775.
155. See id. (“Communitarian theory is grounded in the belief that individual
autonomy divorced from the communal ties that shape that autonomy is incoherent.”).
156. Id.
157. TAYLOR, supra note 148, at 189.
158. Id. at 206.
159. See NOZICK, supra note 71, at 334 (“Treating us with respect by respecting
our rights, it allows us . . . to choose our life and to realize our ends . . . aided by the
voluntary cooperation of other individuals possessing the same dignity.”).
160. TAYLOR, supra note 148, at 205.
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Democratic communitarianism bears at least some resemblance to
populism. Populists, though, have not typically paid significant attention to
With what this Article calls “democratic
corporate governance.161
communitarianism,” I make three populist tweaks to Taylor’s democratic
communitarianism to give it more salience given current trends. First, I add
a suspicion of “elites.”162 Populists worry that elites will seek to rig the game
in their favor.163 Those elites include both large corporations164 and their
directors and executives,165 but they probably include the managers of large
public pension funds as well.166 This is a way of incorporating well-founded

161. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Curious Silence of Populists of Corporate
Purpose and Social Responsibility, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM, STEPHEN
BAINBRIDGE’S J. OF LAW, RELIGION, POLITICS, AND CULTURE (July 12, 2018, 1:57
PM),
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2018/07/thecurious-silence-of-populists-on-corporate-purpose-and-social-responsibility.html
[perma.cc/WW96-CBK9] (noting the “great deal of discussion . . . about the need to
reform big business” but “relatively little discussion of [corporate purpose] in the
populist literature”).
162. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Purpose in a Populist Era, UCLA
SCHOOL OF LAW RESEARCH PAPER SERIES: RESEARCH PAPER NO. 18-09 n. 15 (2018)
[hereinafter Bainbridge, Populist Era], https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstr
act_id=3237107 [perma.cc/32K5-V24X] (“[P]opulism is a worldview that sees
corrupt elites standing in opposition to ordinary people.”) (relying on JOHN B. JUDIS,
THE POPULIST EXPLOSION: HOW THE GREAT RECESSION TRANSFORMED AMERICAN
AND EUROPEAN POLITICS 14 (2016)); see also RUSSELL KIRK, THE POLITICS OF
PRUDENCE 144 (describing populism as “a revolt against the Smart Guys,” largely
represented today by the Knowledge Class).
163. See Robert D. Atkinson et al., How Tech Populism is Undermining
Innovation, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND.: REPORT (Apr. 1, 2015),
http://www2.itif.org/2015-tech-populism.pdf
[perma.cc/CC9K-DMLQ]
(“The
populist view is that elites, especially big business and big government, will prevent
useful rules from being established – or, if those rules are established, will find ways
to bypass them at the expense of the broader public.”); see also Bainbridge, Populist
Era, supra note 162, at 13 (“A 2005 Harris Poll found that ‘big business’ was the
social institution the largest number of respondents identified as having too much
political power.”) (citing EVAN OSBORNE, THE RISE OF THE ANTI-CORPORATE
MOVEMENT: CORPORATIONS AND THE PEOPLE WHO HATE THEM 197 (2009)).
164. See, e.g., Greg Coleridge, The System Isn’t Broken, It’s Fixed: Ending Big
Money and Corporations in Our Elections, 44 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 541, 557 (2013).
165. See, e.g., Bainbridge, Populist Era, supra note 162, at 7 (“Populists
historically have viewed corporate managers and directors as elites opposed to the best
interests of the people.”).
166. Cf. MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL
ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 29 (Princeton University Press 1994) (“By
populism . . . I mean to refer to a widespread attitude that large institutions and

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss1/5

28

Pace: Rogue Corporations

2020]

ROGUE CORPORATIONS

29

concerns about what economically-minded utilitarians would label as agency
costs and regulatory capture.
Second, I add a bias toward smaller communal entities over the
community as a whole. “Smaller communal entities” are also known as
“voluntary associations,”167 “little platoons,”168 “wee little bowls,”169 or
simply “associations.”170 Adding a bias toward smaller communal entities
better provides for pluralism,171 and it recognizes the importance of these
smaller communal entities to civil society.172 To put it in utilitarian terms:
accumulations of centralized economic power are inherently undesirable and should
be reduced even if concentration is productive.”).
167. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 48 (Simon & Schuster Paperbacks 2000) (citing ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 513–17 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence
trans., Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 1969)).
168. BURKE, supra note 73, at 44 (Dover 2006); but see James McElroy, Knock It
Off With the ‘Little Platoons’ Already, THE AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE (June 28,
2018),
https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/knock-it-off-with-thelittle-platoons-already/ [perma.cc/3KAB-353A] (arguing the original Burke quote
does not support the use of the term “little platoons” to apply broadly to smaller
communal entities).
169. Fort, Goldilocks, supra note 152, at 246–47 (arguing that “business ethics
requires authentic communities that respect individual autonomy” to serve as
“mediating institutions” – Fort’s “wee little bowls”).
170. See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1835).
171. Cf. Martin H. Redish, Fear, Loathing, and the First Amendment: Optimistic
Skepticism and the Theory of Free Expression, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 691, 699 (2015)
(“[A]cceptance of pluralism . . . facilitates human flourishing far more than an
exclusively communitarian perspective does.”).
172. See Timothy L. Fort, Corporation as Mediating Institution: An Efficacious
Synthesis of Stakeholder Theory and Corporate Constituency Statutes, 73 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 173, 195–96 (1997) (arguing that “basic human social needs of
affection, friendship, prestige, and recognition” have traditionally been “met by
mediating institutions such as families, churches, and guilds”) (citations omitted). The
concern for smaller communal entities is one shared by Catholic Social Thought. See,
e.g., POPE LEO XIII, Rerum Novarum, ¶ 2 (1891) (“The ancient workmen’s guilds
were destroyed in the last century, and no other organization took their place.”); id.
¶¶ 36–38 (lauding workmen’s associations and “societies for mutual help” for drawing
employers and workmen more closely together); POPE PIUS XI, Quadragesimo Anno,
¶ 37 (1931) (referencing the “gratifying increase and spread of associations among
farmers); POPE JOHN XXIII, Mater et Magistra, ¶ 88 (1961) (encouraging the state to
make special provision for artisan enterprises and cooperative associations via
“instructions, taxes, credit facilities, social security, and insurance”); id. ¶ 146
(encouraging farmers to “strive jointly to set up mutual-aid societies and professional
associations”); POPE PAUL VI, Pacem in Terris, ¶ 24 (1963) (“[I]t is by all means
necessary that a great variety of organizations and intermediate groups be established
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they create positive externalities.173 One may question how well this resulting
model aligns with the corporation. UCLA Law Professor Stephen Bainbridge
does not find the idea that large multinational corporations can perform the
role of smaller communal entities as credible.174 Multinationals are owned by
“a new class of absentee owners” who do not and cannot recognize their
mutual obligations with local communities.175 This does not account for the
role that corporate giving plays in the financing of smaller communal entities
and for the importance of corporate employees in those entities, but that is
probably less true for large multinationals than for local businesses. Purely in
terms of what produces the strongest possible array of smaller communal
entities, there is much to be said for the populist ideal of small businesses
“with local owners who [are] embedded in the community.”176

which are capable of achieving a goal which an individual cannot effectively obtain
by himself.”); POPE PAUL VI, Gaudium et Spes, ¶ 75 (1965) (“Rulers must be careful
not to hamper the development of family, social or cultural groups, nor that of
intermediate bodies or organizations.”); POPE JOHN PAUL II, Laborem Exercens, ¶ 20
(1981) (“All these rights . . . give rise to yet another right: the right of association, that
is, to form associations for the purpose of defending the vital interests of those
employed in the various professions. These associations are called labor or trade
unions . . . . The experience of history teaches that organizations of this type are an
indispensable element of social life.”); POPE JOHN PAUL II, Centesimus Annus, ¶ 13
(1991) (“[T]he social nature of man is not completely filled in the state, but is realized
in various intermediary groups, beginning with the family and including economic,
social, political and cultural groups which stem from human nature itself and have
their own autonomy, always with a view to the common good.”).
173. See, e.g., Jonathan Haidt, Moral Psychology and the Misunderstanding of
Religion, EDGE (Sept. 21, 2007), https://www.edge.org/conversation/jonathan_haidtmoral-psychology-and-the-misunderstanding-of-religion
[perma.cc/6LET-RR2C]
(arguing that churches, social fraternities, and college sports teams generate positive
externalities).
174. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Catholic Social Thought and the Corporation, 1 J.
OF CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 595, 597 (2004) (citing Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Bishops
and the Corporate Stakeholder Debate, 4 VILLANOVA J. L. & INV. MGMT. 3, 15
(2002)); but see Fort, supra note 172, at 175, 196–201 (1997) (arguing that business
can and should serve as “mediating institutions[,] communities which socialize their
members[,] ‘mediating’ between the individual and society as a whole.”).
175. Bainbridge, Populist Era, supra note 162, at 14 (citing PETER KOLOZI,
CONSERVATIVES AGAINST CAPITALISM: FROM THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION TO
GLOBALIZATION 87 (2017)).
176. Id. at 15 (citations omitted); see also Fort, supra note 172, at 176 (“Although
the process is traditionally associated with institutions such as family, church, and the
local community, businesses ought to be mediating institutions as well.”) (citing
Timothy L. Fort, Business as Mediating Institution, 6 BUS. ETHICS Q. 149, 156
(1996)).
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Third, I add a bias toward law and order. This is perhaps only a small
change from democratic communitarianism, which sets great store by laws
passed by duly elected legislatures (and presumably would set even greater
store by popular referendums). But the bias towards law and order ties in with
my first modification due to the common perception that the elite need not
play by the same rules as the unwashed masses.177 And there is an additional
element that goes beyond democratic communitarianism in deferring to legal
authority and prizing stability.178
This also adds shades of civic
republicanism.179
Populist communitarianism has its advantages over Taylor’s democratic
communitarianism, but it too is fatally flawed. Concerns about elites are well
founded, but a simple bias against elites fails to distinguish between elites
whose status is earned by creating value180 and those engaged in rent-seeking.
Too often populist policies hurt the very people they were supposed to
protect.181 The emphasis on smaller communal entities can be difficult to
square with populist rhetoric, which rarely mentions them and tends to focus

177. See supra note 164; see also Bainbridge, Populist Era, supra note 162, at 17
(“[P]opulists have long believed that state law is too lax in regulating large
corporations.”) (citations omitted).
178. Blue-collar families prize stability much more than novelty, in contrast with
the managerial and professional elite. JOAN C. WILLIAMS, WHITE WORKING CLASS 28
(Harvard Bus. Rev. Press 2017); see also The New Political Divide, and a Plan to
Close It, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 25, 2017) https://www.economist.com/books-andarts/2017/03/25/the-new-political-divide-and-a-plan-to-close-it
[perma.cc/B35KRS77] (distinguishing Anywheres who “value social and geographical mobility” from
Somewheres who “value family, authority and nationality”) (emphasis added)
(reviewing DAVID GOODHART, THE ROAD TO SOMEWHERE: THE POPULIST REVOLT
AND THE FUTURE OF POLITICS 44 (Hurst 2017) (associated a question on the British
Social Attitudes survey – “The law should always be obeyed, even if a particular law
is wrong” – and associated it with a subset of his populist Somewheres classification)).
179. See Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 797 (“Public action model adherents
claim . . . the class action is justified solely because it aids in the enforcement of laws
that implement broader purposes.”). Rawls also displays a bias toward law and order.
See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 94, at 340 (“Up to a certain point it is better that the law
and its interpretation be settled than that it be settled rightly.”).
180. The ranks of the wealthiest people in the world are heavy with entrepreneurs.
Catherine Clifford, Entrepreneurs Rank High Among the 50 Wealthiest People in the
World, ENTREPRENEUR (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/270093
[perma.cc/BXC9-PPWJ].
181. Why Tariffs are Bad Taxes, THE ECONOMIST (July 31, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/07/31/why-tariffs-are-badtaxes [perma.cc/W3AS-ULNJ] (explaining why tariffs are regressive and hurt the
poor).
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instead on national unity.182 The emphasis on law and order appears Burkean
in theory,183 but too often looks like mere meanness in practice.184 To the
extent populism is driven by anti-immigration (or anti-immigrant)
sentiment,185 it may be of limited utility for other issues.

2. Catholic Social Thought
The second non-liberal (and non-utilitarian) model I will consider comes
from Catholic Social Thought (“CST”). I include Catholic Social Thought
for four reasons. First, there are well over 50 million Catholics in the United
States,186 and the hierarchical structure and long history of the Church allows
for a central body to build a political theory over time.187 Second, the Church
182. See, e.g., Francis Fukuyama, The Rise of Populist Nationalism, CREDIT
SUISSE (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.credit-suisse.com/corporate/en/articles/newsand-expertise/francis-fukuyama-the-rise-of-populist-nationalism-201801.html
[perma.cc/Z4QS-DTX6] (tying populism to nationalism and pointing to the
institutions of liberal democracy as bulwarks against the two).
183. See Russell Kirk, Edmund Burke and the Principle of Order, THE RUSSELL
KIRK CTR. FOR CULTURAL RENEWAL (Nov. 30, 2009), https://kirkcenter.org/bykirk/burke-principle-of-order-1952/ [perma.cc/7JQT-MEJU] (tying Burke’s political
philosophy to the rule of law and especially to a distinct concept of order).
184. See, e.g., Miriam Jordan, Family Separation May Have Hit Thousands More
Migrant Children Than Reported, THE N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/17/us/family-separation-trump-administrationmigrants.html [perma.cc/C4RP-THD2] (reporting that a new zero tolerance
immigration policy resulted in a “‘sharp increase’ in the number of children separated
from a parent or guardian.”)
185. See generally Eric Kaufmann, WHITESHIFT: POPULISM, IMMIGRATION, AND
THE FUTURE OF WHITE MAJORITIES (Harry N. Abrams 2019) (arguing that populism
on the right is closely tied to how important voters consider restricting immigration
and that the rise of the populist right in Europe is closely tied to a rise in concern over
immigration).
186. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012,
table
75
(2012),
https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2011/compendia/statab/131ed/populatio
n.html [perma.cc/W2UY-QUJ6].
187. Catholic Social Thought, then, is tied to a large political body in way that the
Christian Realism of Reinhold Niebuhr or the liberation theology of Jose Porfirio
Miranda are not. This is no guarantee of salience even among Catholics, of course,
but it gives a stronger base from which to work. Catholic Social Thought is formed
in significant part by seven major encyclicals, or papal letters on Catholic doctrine,
and one pastoral constitution. See POPE LEO XIII, Rerum Novarum, supra note 192;
POPE PIUS XI, Quadragesimo Anno, supra note 172; POPE JOHN XXIII, Mater et
Magistra, supra note 172; POPE PAUL VI, Pacem in Terris, supra note 172; POPE PAUL
VI, Populorum Progression (1967); POPE JOHN PAUL II, Laborem Exercens, supra
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has long worked to position CST as an alternative to both liberalism and
socialism.188 Third, CST is persuasive as a matter of first principles. Fourth,
CST is more concrete than other models, and thus more readily applied.189
CST “focuse[s] more directly on social problems and concrete issues of
justice” than the work of Rawls and Nozick.190 CST also has a long history
as an alternative to liberalism.191
CST has a number of other advantages that make it attractive as a model
of political theory. It has an international perspective relative to other

note 172; and POPE JOHN PAUL II, Centesimus Annus, supra note 172. All quotes are
pulled from DAVID J. O’BRIEN & THOMAS A. SHANNON, EDS., CATHOLIC SOCIAL
THOUGHT: ENCYCLICALS AND DOCUMENTS FROM POPE LEO XIII TO POPE FRANCIS
(Orbis Books 3d ed. 2016).
188. See, e.g., POPE JOHN PAUL II, Laborem Exercens, supra note 172, at ¶ 14
(1981) (“[T]he above principle . . . diverges radically from the program of collectivism
as proclaimed by Marxism . . . . At the same time it differs from the program of
capitalism practiced by liberalism.”); POPE PAUL VI, Octogesima Adveniens ¶ 26
(1971) (“[T]he Christian who wishes to live his faith in a political activity cannot
without contradicting himself adhere to ideological systems which radically or
substantially go against his faith and his concept of man. He cannot adhere to the
Marxist ideology . . . nor can he adhere to the liberal ideology.”); POPE PAUL VI,
Populorum Progression, supra note 187, at ¶ 58 (1967) (“One must recognize that it
is the fundamental principle of liberalism, as the rule for commercial exchange, which
is questioned here.”); POPE JOHN XXIII, Mater et Magistra, supra note 172, at ¶ 23
(1961) (“For the unregulated competition which so-called liberals espouse, or the
class struggle in the Marxist sense, are utterly opposed to Christian teaching and also
to the very nature of man.”); POPE LEO XIII, Rerum Novarum, supra note 172, at ¶ 4
(1891) (“[Socialists] are . . . emphatically unjust, for they would rob the lawful
possessor, distort the functions of the State, and create utter confusion in the
community.”).
189. See POPE JOHN PAUL II, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis ¶ 41 (1987) (“[Catholic
Social Thought] is a doctrine aimed at guiding people’s behavior.”) (emphasis added).
190. LEBACQZ, supra note 85, at 66.
191. See, e.g., Gerald J. Russello, Catholic Social Thought and the Large
Multinational Corporation, 46 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 107, 107 (2007) (“In particular,
CST offers a critique of classical liberal economics and its conception of persons as
autonomous consumers or shareholders seeking to maximize their preferences.”)
(citing Mark Sargent, Utility, the Good and Civic Happiness: A Catholic Critique of
Law and Economics, 44 J. CATH. L. STUD. 35 (2005)); see also POPE JOHN PAUL II,
Laborem Exercens, supra note 172, at ¶ 14 (“[T]he right to private property is
subordinated to the right to common use.”); POPE PAUL VI, Populorum Progression,
supra note 187, at ¶ 58 (“One must recognize that it is the fundamental principle of
liberalism, as the rule for commercial exchange, which is questioned here.”)
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American-, or at least Western-, centric models.192 CST recognizes people as
self-interested.193 CST sees people as simultaneously individuals with
personal “rights and obligations [that] are universal and unviolable”194 and as
members of society with social duties.195 Using CST also allows us to
introduce shades of objective truth communitarianism196 and virtue ethics.197
CST acknowledges the legitimate role of profits.198 But per the Catechism of
the Catholic Church, businesspeople must consider the common good in
addition to profits.199
CST maintains a number of hallmarks across the decades. Like
Rawls,200 CST focuses particularly on the poor201 and concerns itself with
192. See, e.g., POPE JOHN XXIII, Mater et Magistra, supra note 172, at ¶ 178
(“[T]he Church by divine right pertains to all nations. This is confirmed by the fact
that she already is everywhere on earth and strives to embrace all peoples.”).
193. See, e.g., id. at ¶ 229 (“[T]here is deeply rooted in each man an instinctive
and immoderate love of his own interests.”).
194. POPE JOHN PAUL II, Pacem in Terris, supra note 172, at ¶ 9.
195. See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 30–31 (“[I]t also follows that in human society to one man’s
right there corresponds a duty in all other persons: the duty, namely, of acknowledging
and respecting the right in question. . . . A well-ordered human society requires that
men recognize and observe their mutual rights and duties.”).
196. See Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 774 (“‘Objective truth
communitarianism’ posits that there are objectively good and bad policy decisions.”).
197. Bainbridge, CST, supra note 174, at 600 (“Catholic social teaching is the
tradition of virtue ethics.”)
198. POPE JOHN PAUL II, Centesimus Annus, supra note 172, at ¶ 35.
199. UNITED STATES CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC
CHURCH ¶ 2432 (2d ed. 1997); see also Leo L. Clarke & Edward C. Lyons, The
Corporate Common Good: The Right and Obligation of Managers to Do Good to
Others, 32 U. OF DAYTON L. REV. 275, 282 (2007) (“[A]ccording to Catholic social
principles the corporate common good is not simply based on a concept denoting a
full, i.e., fair, economic distribute of profits among stakeholders, but reflects the full
range of ‘human and moral factors’ that stakeholders may rightfully take into account
in pursuing their moral duty to ‘be at the service of the whole of society.’”); Vincent
J. Miller, The Common Good and the Market, AMERICA MAG. (April 1, 2019)
(“[P]apal social teaching has consistently stressed that markets are limited and
imperfect tools with potentially destructive aspects (inequality and exclusion,
environmental degradation, erosion of community). For this reason, they are but one
aspect of broader social flourishing, one that must be yoked to the common good
through other modalities of human freedom.”).
200. Supra Part III.B.1.
201. See, e.g., POPE JOHN XXIII, Pacem in Terris, supra note 172, at ¶ 56
(“Considerations of justice and equity, however, can at times demand that those
involved in civil government give more attention to the less fortunate members of the
community, since they are less able to defend their rights and to assert their legitimate
claims.”); POPE JOHN XXIII, Mater et Magistra, supra note 172, at ¶ 20 (asserting that
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distributive justice.202 CST recognizes the inherent dignity of work203 as well
as the inherent dignity of a human person and its tie to liberty.204 CST also
recognizes the link between liberty and virtue205 and the importance of liberty
to democracy.206 CST recognizes that man is a social animal.207 People and
communities are shaped by their shared past.208 CST recognizes that humans
benefit from the actions of their predecessors and that this creates an ethical
duty to work for the benefit of future humans.209

the State should be especially diligent in safeguarding the rights of “the weaker, such
as workers, women, and children”); see also U.S. CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Economic
Justice for All: Pastoral Letter on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy
¶ 24 (1986) (“The fundamental moral criterion for all economic decisions, policies,
and institutions is this: They must be at the service of all people, especially the poor.”
(emphasis in original)).
202. POPE JOHN XXIII, Mater et Magistra, supra note 172, at ¶ 73–74
(“[V]igilance should be exercised and effective steps taken that class differences
arising from disparity of wealth not be increased, but lessened so far as possible. . . .
“[T]he economic prosperity of any people is to be assessed not so much from the sum
total of goods and wealth possessed as from the distribution of goods according to
norms of justice.”).
203. See, e.g., POPE JOHN PAUL II, Laborem Exercens, supra note 172, at ¶ 9 (“And
yet in spite of all this toil – perhaps, in a sense, because of it – work is a good thing
for man.”).
204. See, e.g., POPE PAUL VI, Guadium et Spes, supra note 172, at ¶ 17 (“[M]an’s
dignity demands that he act according to a knowing and free choice.”); id. at ¶ 59 (“All
of these considerations demand too, that, within the limits of morality and the general
welfare, a man be free to search for the truth, voice his mind, and publicize it; that he
be free to practice any art he chooses; and finally that he have appropriate access to
information about public affairs. It is not the function of public authority to determine
what the proper nature of forms of human culture should be.”).
205. See, e.g., id. at ¶ 17 (“Only in freedom can man direct himself toward
goodness. . . . Man achieves such dignity when . . . he pursues his goal in a
spontaneous choice of what is good.”).
206. See, e.g., id. ¶ 73 (“[T]he protection of personal rights is a necessary
condition for the active participation of citizens, whether as individuals or collectively,
in the life and government of the state.”).
207. See, e.g., POPE JOHN XXIII, Pacem in Terris, supra note 172, at ¶ 31 (“Since
men are social by nature they are meant to live with others and to work for one
another’s welfare.”); POPE PAUL VI, Populorum Progressio, supra note 191, at ¶ 36
(“[M]an finds his true identity only in his social milieu.”).
208. POPE PAUL VI, Guadium et Spes, supra note 172, at ¶ 53.
209. See, e.g., POPE PAUL VI, Populorum Progressio, supra note 191, at ¶ 17 (“We
have inherited from past generations, and we have benefitted from the work of our
contemporaries: for this reason we have obligations toward all, and we cannot refuse
to interest ourselves in those who will come after us to enlarge the human family.”).
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CST remains highly relevant today. The term “social justice” was first
used by Pope Pius XI in 1931 in Quadragesimo Anno.210 Perhaps more
importantly, Pope Pius XI’s encyclical Quadragesimo Anno also introduced
the concept of subsidiarity.211 Subsidiarity is the idea that the lowest level of
organization possible to address an issue should be the one to do so.212 Social
justice has obvious salience, and subsidiarity is an implicit guiding principle
in the constitutional design of the United States213 and an explicit guiding
principle in the constitutional design of the European Union.214 CST makes a
moral case for subsidiarity, but there is sound economic reasoning that favors
subsidiarity as well.215
CST strikes a middle ground between liberalism’s intense focus on the
individual and democratic communitarianism’s rejection of the relevancy of

210. See O’BRIEN & SHANNON, supra note 187, at 42 (“A new phrase – social
justice – appeared in Quadragesimo Anno to describe the type of justice that demanded
due recognition of the common good, a good which included, and did not contradict,
the authentic good of each and every person.”). The term appears in ¶ 58: “Each class,
then, must receive its due share, and the distribution of created goods must be brought
into conformity with the demands of the common good and social justice.” POPE PIUS
XI, Guadium et Spes, supra note 172.
211. POPE PIUS XI, Quadragesimo Anno, supra note 172 at ¶ ¶ 79–80.
Subsidiarity was reaffirmed by Mater et Magistra. POPE JOHN XXIII, supra note 172,
at ¶ 53.
212. POPE JOHN XXIII, Mater et Magistra, supra note 172, at ¶ 53.
213. Compare George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in
the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUMBIA L. REV. 331, 337
(Stating that “[a]lthough subsidiarity has not figured as a term in United States
constitutionalism, it plainly touches on issues of enduring concern to the federalism
balance in [the United States] as well,” but concluding that federalism in the U.S. is
“left entirely to an unstructured political process” and that “no real attempt has been
made to ensure respect for subsidiarity as such”) with Steven G. Calabresi & Lucy D.
Bickford, Federalism and Subsidiarity: Perspectives from U.S. Constitutional Law, in
FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY 8 (James E. Fleming & Jacob T. Levy eds. 2014)
(arguing that, after the “U.S. neo-federalist revival” of the late 1990s, “Bermann’s
claim is thus no longer sustainable, if it ever was”).
214. Bermann, supra note 213, at 334 (1994) (describing subsidiarity as a central
principle for European Union); see also Calabresi & Bickford, supra note 213, at 6
(“The principle of subsidiarity formally entered EU law in the 1992 Treaty of
Maastricht and was reaffirmed by the Treaty of Lisbon.”).
215. See, e.g., Friedrich von Hayek, The Price System as a Mechanism for Using
Knowledge, in COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC SYSTEMS: MODELS AND CASES 29–40
(Homewood, Ill. 1985) (“The knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make
use never exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of
incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals
possess.”).
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the individual.216 For example, the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the
Church defines the common good as “the sum total of social conditions which
allow people, either as groups or as individuals, to reach their fulfillment
more fully and more easily.”217 Private property must be protected, but use
of that property should consider the common good, so restrictions or takings
done for the common good may be justified.218
CST recognizes a role for the state, which means it must accept the
bounds of the law at least some of the time. Law is valuable because it
“affords protection to the citizens both in the enjoyment of their own rights
and in the fulfillment of their duties.”219 Like populist communitarianism,220
CST is concerned with elites using their influence to flout the law to the
detriment of society.221 CST has a great respect for using the law to enforce
and promote social norms, even for things as picayune as speed limits.222 But
laws only “derive their binding force from the law of nature” if they are just.223
216. Milton Friedman criticized CST for a “collectivist moral strain.” Milton
Friedman, Good Ends, Bad Means, in THE CATHOLIC CHALLENGE TO THE AMERICAN
ECONOMY 99 (Thomas M. Gannon ed. 1987).
217. PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, COMPENDIUM OF THE SOCIAL
DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH ¶ 164, http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_cou
ncils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en
.html [perma.cc/HQ42-P9L2].
218. Compare POPE PIUS XI, Guadium et Spes, supra note 172, at ¶ 71 (arguing
private property “constitutes a kind of prerequisite for civil liberties”) with POPE PAUL
VI, Populorum Progressio, supra note 191, at ¶ 24 (arguing expropriation of property
sometimes necessary for the common good where it is “extensive, unused, or poorly
used, or because they bring hardship to peoples or are detrimental to the interests of
the country”). The potential justifications for expropriations of property in Populorum
progressio are very broad. But any arguments for expropriation of corporate assets
on the basis they are “poorly used” are countered by the pressures of the equity
markets and by the possibility of a hostile takeover, not to mention the poor record of
expropriated corporate assets being used for the common good.
219. POPE JOHN XXIII, Pacem in Terris, supra note 172, at ¶ 68.
220. Supra Part III.c.1.
221. POPE PIUS XI, Guadium et Spes, supra note 172, at ¶ 4 (“Yet there are those
who, while possessing grand and rather noble sentiments, nevertheless in reality live
always as if they cared nothing for the needs of society. Many in various places even
make light of social laws and precepts, and do not hesitate to resort to various frauds
and deceptions in avoiding just taxes or other debts due to society.”).
222. Id. (“Others think little of certain norms of social life, for example those
designed for the protection of health, or laws establishing speed limits; they do not
even avert to the fact that by such indifference they imperil their own life and that of
others.”).
223. POPE LEO XIII, Rerum Novarum, supra note 172, at ¶ 8 (“Civil laws . . . as
long as they are just, derive their binding force from the law of nature. The authority
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The people are “conscience-bound to obey” just laws.224 But legitimate
political authority can only “be exercised within the limits of morality and on
behalf of the dynamically conceived common good, according to a juridical
order enjoying legal status.”225 But lack of legitimate political authority alone
is insufficient to relieve one from the obligation to obey. While people should
obey even illegitimate political authority “to the extent that the objective
common good demands,”226 that only goes so far. Law is only binding when
it accords with reason,227 and people have the right “to defend their own rights
and those of their fellow citizens against” abuses of authority.228
CST has taken a much dimmer view of free agreement among parties
than, say, Nozick or the modern law and economics utilitarians. If workers
are not compensated according to the laws of justice and equity, then “justice
is violated in labor agreements, even though they are entered into freely by
both sides.”229 Traditionally, CST has favored a “living” or “family” wage
over a contract wage.230 But given the economics, this frequently counsels
against the regulation of wages: if raising the minimum wage results in
automation and fewer entry-level jobs,231 then leaving be the minimum wage
of divine law adds its sanction, forbidding us in the gravest terms even to covet that
which is another’s.” (emphasis added)).
224. POPE PIUS XI, Guadium et Spes, supra note 172, at ¶ 74.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. POPE LEO XIII, Rerum Novarum, supra note 172, at ¶ 38.
228. POPE PIUS XI, Guadium et Spes, supra note 172, at ¶ 74.
229. POPE JOHN XXIII, Mater et Magistra, supra note 172, at ¶ 18.
230. See, e.g., POPE PIUS XI, Quadragesimo Anno, supra note 172, at ¶ 2(“[T]he
wage scale must be regulated with a view to the economic welfare of the whole
people.”); POPE JOHN XXIII, Mater et Magistra, supra note 172, at ¶ 71 (“We
therefore consider it Our duty to reaffirm that the remuneration of work is not
something that can be left to the laws of the marketplace . . . . [W]orkers must be paid
a wage which allows them to live a truly human life and to fulfill their family
obligations in a worthy manner.”).
231. See, e.g., David Neumark & William L. Wascher, Minimum Wages and
Employment: A Review of Evidence form the New Minimum Wage Research, NAT’L
BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH 121 (2006) (“[T]he oft-stated assertion that the new
minimum wage research fails to support the conclusion that the minimum wage
reduces the employment of low-skilled workers is clearly incorrect. Indeed, in our
view, the preponderance of the evidence points to disemployment effects.”); Grace
Lordan & David Neumark, People Versus Machines: The Impact of Minimum Wages
on Automatable Jobs, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH (2017),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w23667 [perma.cc/C5ST-3WWM] (“[I]ncreasing the
minimum wage decreases significantly the share of automatable employment held by
low-skilled workers, and increases the likelihood that low-skilled workers in
automatable jobs become unemployed.”).
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is the more just result. And evaluation of efforts to provide for a family wage
through government subsidies, such as the earned income tax credit, must take
into account the disincentive to work,232 given the value that CST places on
vocation.
To say that the “fundamental moral criterion for all economic decisions”
is that they “must be at the service of all people”233 is odd given that economic
decisions are typically only at the services of the parties involved. Economic
transactions in a free market create wealth, but absent positive externalities,
they create wealth for the parties involved, not for “all people.” Indeed, even
where positive externalities are present, those positive externalities will likely
only benefit some people, not all people. But how can you criticize, morally,
a transaction that leaves some people better off and hurts no one? The “must”
language used in the Bishop’s Letter would appear to do just that.234
CST even goes so far as to state that “[i]f the positions of the contracting
parties are too unequal, the consent of the parties does not suffice to guarantee
the justice of their contract.”235 This has obvious parallels to the
unconscionability doctrine, which requires unequal bargaining power as the
first element.236 But the focus on relative bargaining power tends to ignore
the walkaway option for the party with lesser bargaining power and the
economic incentives for the party with greater bargaining power to still
provide value to the other party.237 The sort of “one-sided contracts” that tend
to result from disparities in bargaining power can be, and frequently are,
economically efficient.238

232. But see Nada Eissa & Hilary Hoynes, Behavioral Responses to Taxes:
Lessons from the EITC and Labor Supply, NBER Working Paper No. 11729 (2005),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w11729 [perma.cc/KJ8U-7QP3] (surveying the
literature and summarizing it as showing that the EITC encourages people to enter the
work force and does not cause them to work fewer hours).
233. U.S. CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Economic Justice for All, supra note 201, at ¶ 24
(emphasis in original).
234. Id.
235. POPE PAUL VI, Populorum Progressio, supra note 191, at ¶¶ 58–59.
236. See Anne Fleming, The Rise and Fall of Unconscionability as the “Law of
the Poor”, 102 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1383, 1385 (2014) (discussing the
unconscionability doctrine in the United States as established by Williams v. WalkerThomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)).
237. Id. at 1402.
238. See generally, Lucian A. Bebchuk and Richard A. Posner, One-Sided
Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827 (2006) (focusing
on the potential reputational costs to opportunistic businesses).
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CST may be better on subsidiarity in theory than in practice. In practice,
the Church is arguably too quick to endorse top-down solutions.239 And the
Church’s implementation of subsidiarity is arguably self-serving. The Church
presumably interprets subsidiary as requiring both parochial schools and the
Vatican’s international leadership role be protected.240
CST’s persuasive power is limited because it is inextricably tied to
religion. Some people will always reject it for that reason. But liberalism
itself demands that we not reject it solely on the basis of its religious context
and substance. Early American discourse on liberty, for example, put
religious liberty on equal footing with economic liberty and free expression.241
One need not accept the theological implications of CST to accept it as a
persuasive, communitarian model that can be justified using public reason.
Each of the five models of political theory, then, is deeply imperfect.
But each, in turn, has something to offer. Therefore, considering all five
models will provide a richer understanding of a given issue. Indeed, we will
see that each provides some illumination on the optimal rule for director
fiduciary liability for unlawful corporate conduct. Before applying those
models to the issue at hand, though, let us consider several high-profile, recent

239. See, e.g., POPE JOHN PAUL II, Centesimus Annus, supra note 172, at ¶ 58
(“There is a growing feeling . . . that this increasing internationalization of the
economy ought to be accompanied by effective international agencies which will
oversee and direct the economy to the common good, something that an individual
state, even if it were the most powerful on earth, would not be in a position to do.”);
POPE PAUL VI, Populorum Progressio, supra note 191, at ¶ 50 (“A planned program
is of course better and more effective than occasional aid left to individual good
will.”); POPE PIUS XI, Guadium et Spes, supra note 172, at ¶ 65 (“Growth must not be
allowed merely to follow a kind of automatic course resulting from the economic
activity of individuals.”); id ¶ 79 (suggesting that a “competent and sufficiently
powerful authority at the international level” is necessary to prevent war and that its
existence would remove the defense justification for military force); id ¶ 86 (“The
international community . . . should regulate economic relations throughout the world
so that they can unfold in a way that is fair.”).
240. But see POPE JOHN PAUL II, Centesimus Annus, supra note 172, at ¶ 53
(“During the last hundred years the church has repeatedly expressed her thinking,
while closely following the continuing development of the social question. She has
certainly not done this in order to recover former privileges or to impose her own
vision.”).
241. Anastasia P. Boden, Caricature Assassination: Andrew Koppelman and the
Myth of Tough Luck Libertarianism, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 513, 547 (2015)
(internal citations omitted); cf. RAWLS, supra note 94, at 17 (“[W]e are confident that
religious intolerance [is] unjust. We think that we have examined these things with
care and have reached what we believe is an impartial judgment not likely to be
distorted by an excessive attention to our own interests.”).
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examples of unlawful corporate behavior at the tacit direction of or with the
alleged knowledge of the board.

IV. RIPPED FROM THE HEADLINES
Corporate lawbreaking inhabits a greater range than a dichotomy
between a package firm instructing its drivers to cut delivery time by illegally
double-parking242 and a manufacturing company illegally polluting a river.243
Penn Law Professor Elizabeth Pollman has identified numerous other
examples of corporations bumping up against the law.244 In addition to
wrongdoing without social benefit (beyond corporate profit), Pollman groups
unlawful corporate behavior that may have social benefits into the following
categories: innovation and entrepreneurship,245 battles of federalism,246 moral
stances and claims for rights,247 and general business lobbying.248 It is rare,
but not unknown, for a corporate board to direct a violation of positive law.249
This is, of course, much rarer than a corporate violation of positive law for the
simple reason that the vast majority of corporate actions are not taken at the
direction of the board.250 But it does happen, and recent events have given us
more interesting examples than double-parking.
This Section will discuss four recent instances of corporate violations of
positive law either at the board’s direction or with the board’s knowledge:
Uber and its guerilla regulatory tactics, the “legal” marijuana industry,
derivative suits against Google directors related to handling of executives
accused of sexual harassment, and the decisions by Dick’s Sporting Goods
and Walmart to stop selling long guns to eighteen- to twenty-year-olds in
defiance of state civil rights acts barring age discrimination.

A. Uber and Its Guerilla Regulatory Tactics
The taxi industry in the United States is heavily regulated, but that
regulation was designed for a different service than that envisioned by

242. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 272–73
(2002).
243. Strine, supra note 6, at 652 n.71.
244. Pollman, supra note 8, at 729–48.
245. Id. at 732–39.
246. Id. at 739–42.
247. Id. at 742–46.
248. Id. at 747–48.
249. Id. at 722–48.
250. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 34, at 1494 (noting that boards rarely take
“affirmative action on individual matters”).
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Uber.251 Recognizing the threat that the regulatory landscape posed for its
business model, “Uber approached each launch like a guerilla attack,”
launching its services in a given jurisdiction without first meeting with the
relevant regulators.252 After establishing the value of its service to consumers,
Uber would then leverage its customers as grassroots political support for the
regulatory change that would allow it to continue to operate.253 In the process,
it ignored a cease-and-desist letter from the San Francisco Metro Transit
Authority and California Public Utilities Commission and “repeatedly paid
fines and settlements as a cost of doing business.”254 Ignoring legacy
regulations was so central to Uber’s corporate strategy that it defies belief that
it did not take place without the approval of the board.255 Indeed, according
to Bradley Tusk, the political consultant who helped design Uber’s strategy,
it became known as Travis’ Law, named after Uber co-founder and then-CEO
Travis Kalancik.256 Tusk reports that Kalanick characterized the need for
Uber’s strategy as existential: “If we have to ask for something that’s already
legal, we’ll never roll out.”257 But when Kalanick described the legal stakes
as “fines[, t]owing cars[, s]tuff like that,” Tusk responded that “those are just
costs of doing business.”258
Uber’s actions would, at the very least, fall afoul of the Seventh Circuit’s
approach applying Delaware precedent in In re Abbott to hold that failing to
stop known violations of the law is intentional behavior on the part of the
board.259 The Fourth Circuit, applying California law, even held that nonillegal conduct that intentionally skirted the regulatory authority of a
government agency was bad faith.260 But it is hard to believe that Uber’s
skirting of the law resulted in harm to the corporation: at one time Uber was

251. Rafi Mohammed, Regulation Is Hurting Cabs and Helping Uber, HARV. BUS.
REV. (July 9, 2014), https://hbr.org/201 4/07/regulation-is-hurting-cabs-and-helpinguber [perma.cc/U7Y4-FUHW] (“Much of [Uber’s] spectacular growth has been
fueled by outdated regulation.”).
252. Pollman, supra note 8, at 734 (quoting ADAM LASHINSKY, WILD RIDE: INSIDE
UBER’S QUEST FOR WORLD DOMINATION 97 (2017)).
253. Id. at 723; see also BRADLEY TUSK, THE FIXER: MY ADVENTURES SAVING
STARTUPS FROM DEATH BY POLITICS 109 (2018).
254. Pollman, supra note 8, at 722.
255. Id. at 734.
256. TUSK, supra note 253, at 109.
257. Id. at 108.
258. Id.
259. See supra Part II.
260. In re Landmark Land Co., 76 F.3d 553, 565 (4th Cir. 1996).
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the most valuable private company in the world.261 In skirting taxi cab
regulations, Uber has also created social benefits.262
Uber raises an interesting question regarding a per se standard for
violations of law: how should it treat a series of aggressive, questionable, but
not clearly illegal business choices?

B. The “Legal” Marijuana Industry
Medical marijuana is legal under state law in thirty-three states,
including New York and Florida.263 Recreational marijuana is also legal
under state law in eleven states, including California and now Illinois.264 But
marijuana remains a Schedule I controlled substance under federal law.265
261. Zack Friedman, These 197 Tech Companies Are the World’s Most Valuable
(May
30,
2017),
Unicorns,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/2017/05/30/techunicorns/#29079f871179 [perma.cc/8CLQ-5U49]; but see Heather Somerville, Uber
narrows loss but still a long way from profitability, REUTERS (Aug. 15, 2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/uber-results/uber-narrows-loss-but-still-a-long-wayfrom-profitability-idUSL1N1V611I [perma.cc/A7FX-QBG4] (Uber may have
“narrowed” its net loss to $891 million for a quarter, but it remains an unprofitable
business).
262. See Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 UNIV. OF CHI. L. REV.
ONLINE 85, 86, 90–91 (2017) (stating that Uber has “created a far more efficient
market for car-hire services,” has had “obvious positive effects on consumer welfare,”
has reduced environmental harms by reducing “consumers’ incentives to purchase
automobiles,” may reduce drunk driving, and that its model “may enable Uber and
regulators to ensure safety and root out discrimination against passengers with relative
ease”); Alissa Walker, Lyft and Uber Serve Low-Income Communities Better than
Taxis, Says Sudy, CURBED (July 2, 2018), https://www.curbed.com/2018/7/2/1751153
0/lyft-ride-hailing-taxis-discrimination [perma.cc/C7B9-43KQ] (describing study
suggesting that taxi companies were more likely to engage in discriminatory behavior
than Uber and Lyft). As a maturing, now publicly-held company, Uber is starting to
play nice with law enforcement. Sarah Frier, Uber Wants the Law on Its Side,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/artic
les/2019-04-23/uber-shares-ride-data-to-get-law-enforcement-on-its-side
[perma.cc/TQ5K-PP63].
263. State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Feb. 27,
2019),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx
[perma.cc/D8T8-7JX2].
264. Marijuana Overview, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct. 17, 2019),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/marijuana-overview.aspx
[perma.cc/U7G5-ASGE].
265. 21 U.S.C. § 812 Schedule I(C)(10) (2018); Leah Asmelash & Melissa
Alonso, Illinois Lieutenant Governor Beats Long Lines to Become One of the First to
Legally Buy Weed in the State, CNN (Jan. 1, 2020, 5:12 PM),

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020

43

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 5

44

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

The cultivation and sale of marijuana is a growth business nonetheless.
Marijuana dispensaries outnumber Starbucks in some locales,266 and a
marijuana business might be worth hundreds of millions of dollars.267 State
legalization lowers the risk of selling marijuana, but it does not insulate
dispensaries from the threat of federal raids.268 And as marijuana remains
prohibited under federal law, the directors of any marijuana business
organized as a corporation would fall afoul of a per se rule for allowing it to
remain in the marijuana business.269 Even if the business is incorporated in a
state where marijuana is legal, violations of federal positive law would still
presumably trigger the per se standard.270
Marijuana businesses are still in their nascence in the United States. Due
to the challenges described here and elsewhere,271 marijuana business owners
may avoid organizing their businesses using a legal entity altogether. This
would cost them access to limited liability and the advantages of entity
personhood but may save them from fiduciary liability. One of the few large,
incorporated, publicly traded marijuana businesses is MedMen Enterprises,
Inc.272 MedMen trades on the Canadian Stock Exchange because the legal
status of marijuana prevents it from using American exchanges.273 It has U.S.

https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/01/us/illinois-marijuana-juliana-stratton-linestrnd/index.html [perma.cc/7FHG-LDAB].
266. Luke Scheuer, The “Legal” Marijuana Industry’s Challenge for Business
Entity Law, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 511, 522 (2015) (relying on Nancy Benac &
Alicia Caldwell, Marijuana Legalization Gains Support, Confounding Policymakers,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 29, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/29/narij
uana-legalization n 3521547.html [perma.cc/NGE7-25VK]).
267. Id.
268. Id. at 526–27.
269. Marijuana businesses (and the businesses that do business with them) face
other hurdles in utilizing U.S. business law infrastructure. See, e.g., Clifford J. White
III & John Sheahan, Why Marijuana Assets May Not Be Administered in Bankruptcy,
36 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 34, 34 (2017) (“[T]he bankruptcy system may not be used as
an instrument in the ongoing commission of a crime, and reorganization plans that
permit or require continued illegal activity may not be confirmed.”); Arthur Linton
Corbin, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS vol. 6A § 1373 (West 1962) (“A bargain may be
illegal because the performance that is bargained for is illegal; and the performance
may be illegal because governmental authority has declared it to be a ‘crime.’”).
270. See supra Part II.B.
271. See generally Scheuer, supra note 266.
272. James F. Peltz, Fast Growing Pot Seller MedMen Faces Lawsuit by Former
Insider, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-ficannabis-medmen-lawsuit-20190224-story.html [perma.cc/5962-T64N].
273. Stephen Rodrick, Rise of Big Weed: MedMen’s Growing Pains, ROLLING
STONE
(Apr.
16,
2019),
https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-
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subsidiaries (a Delaware LLC and a California corporation), but MedMen
itself is incorporated in Canada.274 There are currently two lawsuits pending:
one against the founders alleging breach of fiduciary duty, the other against
the company alleging a variety of misconduct.275 These suits do not include
per se claims, but they highlight that marijuana businesses are already
involved in breach of fiduciary suits. The cost to the plaintiff of tacking on a
per se claim – thus increasing the risk of and potential magnitude of liability
for the directors – is relatively low.

C. Google and Board Imprimatur for Sexual Harassment
The Me Too movement is resulting in more than just embarrassment for
companies: it is creating legal risk for directors.276 The usual view might be
that any board fiduciary liability for sexual harassment by company
employees would be limited to Caremark claims.277 But rather than pursue
“possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff
might hope to win a judgment,”278 the complaint in a recent derivative suit
against board members of Google’s parent company states outright, “This is
not a ‘failure to supervise’ case.”279
Rather, the complaint alleges that the board “was directly involved in
and approved” the relevant severance payments.280 It “violated California and
federal law” when it “allowed the illegal conduct to proliferate and

features/medmen-dispensaries-lawsuit-scandal-marijuana-pot-822427/
[perma.cc/UV26-YWJC].
274. Complaint at ¶ 3, Parker v. MM Enterprises USA, LLC, No. 19-smcvV00189 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Jan. 29, 2019).
275. James Peltz, Fast-Growing Pot Seller MedMen Faces Lawsuit by Former
Insider, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-ficannabis-medmen-lawsuit-20190224-story.html [perma.cc/36HT-NPMJ]; Complaint
at ¶ 2, MMMG-MC, Inc. v. Bierman, No. 19-smcv-00045, (Cal. Sup. Ct. Jan. 8, 2019);
Complaint, Parker v. MM Enterprises USA, LLC, No. 19-smcv-00189 (Cal. Sup. Ct.
Jan. 29, 2019).
276. See generally Daniel Hemel & Dorothy S. Lund, Sexual Harassment and
Corporate Law, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1583, 1612–66 (2018) (surveying a number of
post-Me Too derivative lawsuits and noting that claims may fall under Caremark or a
per se standard, although the latter “is perhaps the doctrinal category in which the
doctrinal case for liability is the weakest”).
277. Id. at 1630–41.
278. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch.
1996).
279. Complaint at ¶ 12, Martin v. Page, No. 19-civ-00164 (Sup. Ct. Cali. Jan. 10,
2019) (emphasis removed).
280. Id.
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continue.”281 Because the board did not meet its obligation to conduct
Google’s affairs “in compliance with all applicable laws, rules, and
regulations,”282 the board’s actions were bad faith and “f[e]ll outside the scope
of the business judgment rule.”283 The complaint points not just to direct harm
to Google caused by the alleged unlawful conduct but also to indirect harm
such as a recent coordinated employee walkout across Google offices.284
The allegations against Google directors might seem thin. The
unredacted portions of the complaint are not clear as to what exactly was the
underlying unlawful conduct, and it is by no means certain that reacting to
unlawful conduct by terminating the offending party – even with a hefty
severance – qualifies as failing to stop known violations of the law under In
re Abbott.285 But the yawning chasm between the standards for a per se claim
and a Caremark claim makes the complaint’s characterization as “not a failure
to supervise case” dangerous to Google.
Another example from the Me Too movement where the per se standard
might apply is with Harvey Weinstein and the Weinstein Company. Did the
board fail to meet its duty to monitor by approving an employment agreement
for Harvey Weinstein that effectively allowed him to buy his way out of
sexual assault and harassment scandals with a liquidated damages
provision?286 Weinstein’s 2015 employment contract provided that if he
“treated someone improperly in violation of the company’s Code of Conduct,”
he would be required to reimburse the company for settlements and judgments
and to “pay the company liquidated damages of $250,000 for the first such
instance, $500,000 for the second such instance, $750,000 for the third such
instance, and $1,000,000 for each additional instance.”287
Bainbridge has argued that a board presented with red flags has a duty
to investigate under Caremark,288 and the Weinstein Company board surely
281. Id. ¶ 43.
282. Id. ¶ 56.
283. Id. ¶ 14.
284. Id. ¶ 152–56.
285. See supra Part II.
286. See Hemel & Lund, supra note 276, at 1643–44 (discussing the possibility of
a fiduciary suit against the Weinstein Company based on a failure to monitor).
287. Harvey Weinstein’s Contract with TWC Allowed for Sexual Harassment,
TMZ (Oct. 12, 2017 2:57 PM), http://www.tmz.com/2017/10/12/weinstein-contractthe-weinstein-company-sexual-harassment-firing-illegal/
[perma.cc/99M5-9E8A]
(quoting Weinstein’s employment contract).
288. Stephen M. Bainbridge, CEO Private Lives in the Present Dystopia,
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (May 9, 2018), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/pr
ofessorbainbridgecom/2018/05/ceo-private-lives-in-the-present-dystopia.html
[perma.cc/R4BV-RJSG] (citing Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise
Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967 (2009)).
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was presented with red flags, given the content of his employment
agreement.289 Moreover, the board’s actions may fall under the stricter
standard from In re Abbott rather than Caremark. The directors certainly
“knew of the violations of law,” and the company surely suffered “substantial
. . . losses.”290 But the board did take steps to “prevent or remedy the
situation.”291 The decision to attempt to prevent illegal behavior through
financial disincentives rather than either firing Weinstein outright or firing
him when he treated someone else improperly might be ethically dubious and
it may have been bad business judgment, but it would seem to be just the sort
of business judgment the business judgment rule is designed to protect. A per
se standard threatens to treat that decision much more harshly.

D. Dick’s Sporting Goods and Walmart Violate Civil Rights Laws by
Refusing to Sell Guns
Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, Dick’s Sporting Goods and
Walmart recently announced that they would cease all firearms sales to
eighteen- to twenty-year-olds.292 Unfortunately for those companies, several
states have enacted civil rights laws barring age discrimination in places of
public accommodation such as retailers.293 The change in policy has
significant business implications.294 But the change in policy at Dick’s, at
289. Cf. Ted Johnson, Weinstein Scandal Triggers Questions of Corporate
(Oct.
25,
2017),
Liability
and
Even
Complicity,
VARIETY
https://variety.com/2017/biz/news/harvey-weinstein-sexual-harassment-corporateliability-21st-century-fox-1202598683/ [perma.cc/YL6K-87KM] (quoting prominent
Delaware lawyer Franci G.X. Pileggi for the proposition that “If it is correct that the
board knew about this propensity and the future likelihood of an occurrence, then the
question would be whether the board was fulfilling its fiduciary duty”).
290. In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 809 (7th Cir.
2003).
291. Id.
292. Julie Creswell and Michael Corkery, Walmart and Dick’s Raise Minimum
Age for Gun Buyers to 21, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/28/business/walmart-and-dicks-major-gunretailers-will-tighten-rules-on-guns-they-sell.html [perma.cc/2YQZ-FYE5]. Dick’s
and Walmart are already barred by federal law from selling handguns to 18- to 20year-olds, so the new policy only applies to long guns such as rifles and shotguns.
293. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2302(a) (2019); OR. REV. STAT. §
659A.409 (2019).
294. Dick’s change in policy was spurred in part by learning that the Parkland
shooter bought some of his guns at a Dick’s location. The possibility of selling guns
to a mass shooter creates litigation risk. See, e.g., Texas Judge Lets Church Shooting
Victims
Sue
Gun
Retailer,
U.S.
News
(Feb.
4,
2019),
https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/texas/articles/2019-02-04/texas-judge-
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least, appears to have been driven in significant part by Dick’s CEO Edward
Stack’s view that “we have a problem with gun laws in this country” and that
the change “was about our values and standing up for what we think is right”
even if it “would have a negative effect on [Dick’s] business” because the
“issue transcends [Dick’s] bottom line.”295 The Monday after the Parkland
shooting, Stack told Lee Belitsky, Dick’s CFO, “I don’t really care what the
financial implication is.”296 Dick’s policy change, then, is the sort of
lawbreaking Pollman categorizes as a moral stance.297 The financial
implication itself is hard to pinpoint, but sales and net income are down.298
According to Stack, he expected the change in policy to cost Dick’s “[a]
quarter of a billion dollars” and the company did lose close to that.299 Stack
pointed to both public backlash against its policy change and to competition
from Amazon as drivers in the declines.300 Dick’s stock price dropped in
response to its announcement of declining sales and net income, but its stock
price still rose ten percent between February 2018 and March 2019.301
Because the board expressly approved Stack’s proposal,302 it also would
fall afoul of a per se rule. Indeed, Dick’s and Walmart have already been sued

lets-church-shooting-victims-sue-gun-retailer [perma.cc/XAR6-B48X] (reporting on
a judicial ruling that will allow a lawsuit to move forward against Academy Sport &
Outdoors for selling a gun to the 2017 Sutherland Spring shooter).
295. Edward W. Stack, Opinion, I Run Dick’s Sporting Goods. It’s Congress’s
Turn to do Something About Guns, WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/i-run-dicks-sporting-goods-its-congresssturn-to-do-something-about-guns/2018/03/21/3dd1b040-2c3f-11e8-b0b0f706877db618_story.html?utm_term=.bb93b6f4605f [perma.cc/FB98-MB6Q].
296. Sarah Nassauer, How Dick’s Sporting Goods Decided to Change Its Gun
Policy, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/howdicks-sporting-goods-decided-to-change-its-gun-policy-1543955262
[perma.cc/5A7J-PKN9].
297. Pollman, supra note 8, at 742.
298. Tiffany Hsu, Dick’s Sporting Goods Shifts From Guns Even as Sales Suffer,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/12/business/dickssporting-goods-stock-gun-control.html [perma.cc/G8AJ-6J3G].
299. Michelle Kessel, Corporations and Guns: How Companies Are Reshaping
the Gun Control Debate, CBS NEWS (Oct. 6, 2019, 9:31AM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/corporations-and-guns-how-companies-arereshaping-the-gun-control-debate/ [perma.cc/5SS7-XQU9].
300. Tiffany Hsu, Dick’s Sporting Goods Shifts From Guns Even as Sales Suffer,
N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/12/business/dicks-sporting-goodsstock-gun-control.html [perma.cc/HL5Z-GXAS].
(Mar. 12, 2019).
301. Id.
302. Nassauer, supra note 296.
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in Oregon and Michigan under those states’ respective civil rights laws.303
Dick’s settled the Oregon suit but has not changed its policy.304 The Oregon
Bureau of Labor & Industries “issued a memo . . . suggesting that it is illegal
for retailers to restrict gun and ammunition sales based on the buyers [sic]
age” after a complaint was filed by an eighteen-year-old when a Walmart store
refused to sell her a rifle or ammunition.305

V. APPLYING THE LEGAL AND ETHICAL FRAMEWORK
Both observance and disregard of the law have a long tradition in moral
argument. Martin Luther King, Jr. pointed to Augustine and Thomas Aquinas
in dividing laws into just and unjust.306 Unjust laws are defined by their lack
of “harmony with the moral law.”307 Relying on Aquinas, King pointed to
eternal law and natural law as the source of moral law.308 Just laws carry “not
only a legal but a moral responsibility” of obedience.309 But “one has a moral
responsibility to disobey unjust laws.”310 King did not seem to provide for
any middle ground where a director can exercise discretion. But King was
303. Complaint, Watson v. Dick’s Sporting Goods, Inc., No. 18-cv-07671 (Cir.
Ct. Ore. March 5, 2018); Complaint, Watson v. Walmart, Inc., No. 18-cv-07628 (Cir.
Ct. Ore. March 5, 2018); Complaint, Fulton v. Dick’s Sporting Goods (Cir. Ct. Mich.
Mar. 6, 2018); Nick Morgan, Injunction Denied in Under-21 Gun Suit, MAIL TRIBUTE
(Apr. 13, 2018), http://mailtribune.com/news/crime-courts-emergencies/injunctiondenied-in-under-21-gun-suit [perma.cc/UV8Z-3WE9]; see also Jazz Shaw, Oregon
Looks to End Walmart’s Policy Against Rifle Sales To 18 To 20 Year Olds, HOT AIR
(Sept. 4, 2018, 6:41PM), https://hotair.com/archives/2018/09/04/oregon-looks-endwalmarts-policy-rifle-sales-18-20-year-olds/ [perma.cc/QGB4-P883] (reporting on
the Watson suit and another lawsuit against Walmart on the same basis); Nick Morgan,
supra note 53 (reporting on similar suits against two other retailers).
304. Jonathan Levinson, Dick’s Sporting Goods Settles Lawsuit Over Gun Sale
Age Restrictions, OR. PUB. BROADCASTING (Dec. 4, 2018 5:06 PM),
https://www.opb.org/news/article/dicks-sporting-goods-settles-lawsuit-gun-sale-agerestrictions/ [perma.cc/6HYY-FH8H].
305. Ted Sickinger, Oregon retailers can’t bar gun sales based on age, BOLI
suggests, THE OREGONIAN, (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.oregonlive.com/politics/ind
ex.ssf/2018/08/oregon_retailers_cant_bar_gun.html [perma.cc/WZ34-FWL4]; but
see Nick Morgan, supra note 303 (quoting lawyers for Dick’s as arguing that “The
letter does not state that the refusal to sell firearms to those under 21 is illegal, and it
expresses no opinion on the merits of any potential claim”).
306. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter From Birmingham Jail, ATLANTIC MONTHLY
(Aug. 1963).
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. (emphasis added).
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also making an argument about when one should violate the law, not about
liability for doing so. Indeed, King believed that civil disobedience must be
done “with a willingness to accept the penalty.”311 King’s arguments tell us
very little about what the appropriate standard of liability should be for
directors for breach of fiduciary duty.
Others have taken for granted that economic activity should not violate
the law. Adam Smith said that “[e]very man, as long as he does not violate
the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest in his own
way.”312 Milton Freidman famously said that in a free economy, “there is one
and only one social responsibility of business – to use its resources and engage
in activities designed to increase its profits . . . .”313 The next part of that
sentence, though, is “so long as it stays within the rules of the game.”314 This
might seem to embrace Strine’s view of the law, but Friedman defined the
“rules of the game” as “engag[ing] in open and free competition, without
deception or fraud.”315 It is possible to violate any number of laws and
regulations while openly and freely competing in the marketplace, without
deception or fraud,316 just as Smith’s “laws of justice” do not necessarily
extend to all laws.317
Complicating matters is the extreme growth in laws malum prohibitum
relative to laws malum in se.318 To put it another way, behavior is increasingly
prohibited by law because it is against the law, not because it is morally
wrong. A definition of good faith that extends to violations of laws malum
prohibitum would then significantly restrict the discretion of directors
operating in a highly regulated economy where criminal law is increasingly
used as a tool to regulate corporate conduct.319 Beveridge claims that there
are no corporations in compliance with the law, only corporations “out of

311. Id.
312. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 687 (LONDON, W. STRAHAN & T.
CADELL 1776) (emphasis added).
313. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 112 (U. Chi. Press 1962).
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. But see Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase
Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32 (arguing that “the basic rules of
society” include “both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom,”
implying that what a businessperson may not do in the pursuit of profit is larger than
the law, not smaller).
317. SMITH, supra note 312, at 687.
318. Crimes that are malum prohibitum “are acts that are criminal merely because
they are prohibited by statute, not because they violate natural law.” Bainbridge,
Convergence, supra note 11, at 592.
319. Id. at 594.
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compliance with the law to varying degrees.”320 Given the proliferation of
law and regulations, any and all violations of law simply cannot fairly be
characterized as “a dishonest, pretextual use of power for noncorporate
purposes.”321
Complicating our inquiry is that we are not asking whether illegal
conduct should lead to liability. We are asking whether illegal conduct should
lead to liability by the directors for breach of fiduciary duty to the corporation
(and, indirectly, its shareholders). One way to analytically tie the former to
the latter is by arguing that shareholders lack the authority to direct the
corporation to violate the law.322 Strine expresses incredulity that “an act of
intentional misconduct that injures the corporation could be loyal.”323 If
shareholders lack the authority to direct the corporation to violate the law,
then violating the law is disloyal because the shareholders necessarily have
not authorized it. But the moral authority to direct an action by the
corporation324 is not the same as the actual authority to do so. A controlling
shareholder who directs the corporation to violate the law would not then be
able to disclaim liability on the basis that they lacked the authority to do so.
Strine’s approach could also create significant liability – if only in the
form of attorneys’ fees – even where there is no injury to the corporation. The
question is how strict a standard should apply. Standards in Delaware in the
corporate governance context range from the very lenient business judgment
rule to the much stricter per se standard that Strine seems to advocate.325 The
stark difference in standards for conduct that may be functionally and morally
equivalent, but-for falling afoul of one of thousands upon thousands of
picayune laws and regulations,326 adds just the sort of confusion that the

320. Norwood P. Beveridge, Does the Corporate Director Have a Duty Always to
Obey the Law?, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 729, 732 (1996).
321. Strine, supra note 7, at 655.
322. Cf. Ostas, Cooperate, Comply, or Evade?, supra note 138, at 591 (“The sole
proprietor is generally free to maximize the profitability of his or her business
operations; however, he or she cannot do so in a way that violates the spirit of high
moral content regulation. If the proprietor becomes a passive shareholder and hires
the CEO to manage the firm, the proprietor has no moral authority to authorize the
CEO to do anything that the proprietor could not ethically do.”); see also PRINCIPLES
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01(b)(1) (AM.
LAW INST. 1994) (“[T]he corporation, in the conduct of its business is obliged, to the
same extent as a natural person, to act within the boundaries set by law.”).
323. But see Strine, supra 6, at 660.
324. Ostas, Cooperate, Comply, or Evade?, supra note 138, at 591.
325. See Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the
Insurance Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 1155, 1156–57 (1990).
326. The makers of Country Time Lemonade covered legal fines for children
operating unlicensed lemonade stands. Jason Kottke, Country Time Will Cover Illegal
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Delaware legislature and courts seek to mitigate.327 Stone v. Ritter provided
doctrinal clarity;328 making violations of law per se acts of bad faith would
remove much of that clarity. Adding a requirement that the violation be
“knowing” would reduce liability but would reduce certainty as well.329
One answer is to use violations of law as a burden shifting trigger rather
than as a basis for liability. For example, the Delaware Supreme Court held
in Technicolor that, if the burden of proof for a breach of duty of care claim
was met, then the burden shifted to the directors, who now had the burden of
showing that they caused no harm (entire fairness) rather than the plaintiffs
having the burden of showing damages.330 This approach would allow
directors to escape liability where the corporation was not harmed (albeit not
where they incorrectly believed that the corporation would not be harmed).331
To consider the appropriate rule, we now return to our five models of political
theory.

A. Communitarian Models
In some ways, a per se standard for violations of positive law is more
easily reconciled with a non-liberal model than with a liberal model. To say
that violating the law violates the duty of loyalty raises the question: loyalty
to whom? The traditional formulation of fiduciary duty was that the loyalty
of the director to the corporation must be “undivided and unselfish.”332 Under
a per se standard, the loyalty of the director is no longer undivided. The
adherent of populist communitarianism would be pleased to see the director
ordered to show an element of loyalty to the state and its elected
representatives. The adherent of CST may have more mixed feelings.

Lemonade Stand Fines and Fees This Summer, KOTTKE.ORG (June 12, 2018),
https://kottke.org/18/06/country-time-will-cover-illegal-lemonade-stand-fines-andfees-this-summer [perma.cc/7FVC-TY2P]; see also Daniel T. Ostas, Civil
Disobedience in a Business Context: Examining the Social Obligation to Obey Inane
Laws, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 291, 302 (2010) (noting that some business regulations “have
no moral justification whatsoever.”).
327. Cf. Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the
Insurance Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 1155, 1160 (1990) (stating that the Van Gorkom
decision “exemplifies the legal uncertainty that contributed to the insurance crisis”).
328. Strine, supra note 6, at 695.
329. See id.
330. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 370–71 (Del. 1993)
331. Id. at 371.
332. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939), superseded by statute, DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2001); see also Pace, supra note 19, at 711–13 (giving
examples of courts using morally inflected language to talk about fiduciary duties).
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1. Populist Communitarianism
Both the democratic communitarian and the populist communitarian
would support a per se rule on the basis that it allows “justice to be defined
by the . . . political preferences of those who . . . have been vested with the a
priori power to define justice.”333 The populist communitarian might disagree
with the democratic communitarian on, for example, the appropriateness of
the Apple CEO publishing an open letter criticizing a court order that it
decrypt an iPhone used by a terrorist.334 The democratic communitarian
might see the letter as an individual with special knowledge contributing to
the public debate and engaging with the democratic process on an important
issue. The populist communitarian might see the criticism of the court as a
threat to public order and stability coming from an elite who does not want to
play by the same rules as everyone else.
Taking my tweaks to democratic communitarianism into account, the
populist communitarian would be more favorable to a per se rule. A per se
rule emphasizes the importance of community norms expressed through
positive law, presumably including local ordinances. A small, local,
privately-held business may fit the definition of a “smaller communal entity,”
while a large, national, publicly-held corporation does not.335 The populist
communitarian would for that reason prefer the ability to impose community
norms through local ordinances. A per se rule has embedded within it a strong
presumption in favor of law and stability. A per se rule “acknowledges
societal interests in the rule of law.”336 The populist communitarian would be
leery of the sort of “disobedience with the potential for innovation or change”
that Pollman discusses.337 A per se rule also shackles large corporations and
their elite managers and directors. This would be particularly attractive to a
populist communitarian who decries elites who do not have to play by the
same rules as the rest of society. An approach that insulated directors from
liability for violations of positive law through the business judgment rule
would appear as just that to the populist communitarian.

333. Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 774 (emphasis added).
334. See Pollman, supra note 8, at 737–39 (discussing the situation and quoting
the open letter).
335. See id. at 763 (“[Public corporations] are not associational in terms of fitting
a paradigm of a voluntary association or community in which individuals feel a sense
of connection.” (citing Elizabeth Pollman, Constitutionalizing Corporate Law, 69
VAND. L. REV. 639, 672–73) (2016))).
336. Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Oversight and Disobedience, 72 VANDERBILT
L. REV. 101, 105 (2019).
337. Id. at 731–48.
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2. Catholic Social Thought
Things are more complicated viewed through the perspective of CST.
More than any other theory discussed in this Article, CST is concerned with
moral questions that go beyond positive law. CST sets a clear hierarchy when
it comes to natural and positive law: a positive law that violates natural law
must yield to natural law.338 This raises the obvious question: who is
competent to judge positive law against natural law, if not legislatures?
Judges? Individuals? Shareholders, either individually or collectively?
In a pluralistic society where the state plays a significant role, laws and
regulations will inevitably conflict with an individual’s deeply held principles.
But a corporation might “act as a vital counterweight against the state – an
alternative island of power within society.”339 A per se rule substitutes “some
judge’s or some bureaucrat’s definition of honor” for individuals’ own
definition of “what constitutes trustworthy or honorable behavior.”340 Rather
than making people virtuous, a per se rule displaces personal virtue.341
Allowing federal, or even foreign, law342 to hijack state fiduciary
obligation law would also seem to violate the principle of subsidiarity.343 The
old approach, requiring that corporations receive a charter from the state,344 is
antithetical to subsidiarity. Charters on demand allow for an essential, organic
formation of corporations, which is more in keeping with the principle of
subsidiarity.345 Corporations are creatures in the state in that they rely on a
state-issued charter to receive the benefits of the corporate form (most notably,
limited liability).346 But to give that any real teeth – say by including a
condition that the corporation follow the law, on pain of fiduciary liability for
its directors – moves corporations back to the traditional approach. It violates
subsidiarity because it does something at the level of a state that can be done
at a lower level – the corporate level itself. It should go without saying that
the charter-on-demand corporation has been vastly more successful than the

338. See, e.g., Avery Cardinal Dulles, S.J., Catholic Social Teaching and
American Legal Perspective, 30 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 277, 282 (2002).
339. Bainbridge, CST, supra note 174, at 598.
340. Id. at 600.
341. Id. (appealing to the authority of Michael Novak, Russell Kirk, and
Christopher Lasch).
342. See supra Part II.
343. See supra Part III.C.
344. Cf. Clarke & Lyons, supra note 199, at 289 (“Originally, corporations were
viewed as quasi-public entities.”).
345. See supra Part III.C.
346. See supra Part III.C.2.
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state-issued-charter corporation. Conversely, the corporation may be able to
accomplish just acts that could not be accomplished by individuals.347
CST distinguishes between just and unjust laws.348 It is lawful to resist
abuses of authority if that resistance is within “the limits imposed by natural
law and the gospel.”349 Under CST, the board can350 – and, indeed, should –
disobey unjust laws. But conversely, the board must obey just laws.351 A
board is not justified, for example, in violating hours and wages laws352 or
environmental protection laws.
A per se rule, then, is clearly too inflexible. Bainbridge argues that “the
Church properly is concerned less with rigid codes of conduct than with
promoting sound context-based judgment.”353 Directors must have some
leeway for matters of conscience.354 A per se rule is justifiable for violations
of law malum in se – in fact, it is preferable – but violations of law malum
prohibitum should be shielded by the business judgment rule, or, if part of an
interested transaction, be subject to the entire fairness standard and the normal
rules for voiding and cleansing. Even that is not as straightforward as it might
seem because there is no clear line between violations of law malum in se and
malum prohibitum.355 A violation of a requirement that employee health
insurance plans cover contraception (or a violation of civil rights laws that
demand retailers not refuse to sell long guns to eighteen- to twenty-year-olds)
347. Clarke & Lyons, supra note 199, at 297–98.
348. Supra Part III.C.2.
349. POPE PAUL VI, Gaudium et Spes, supra note 172, at ¶ 4.
350. See, e.g., POPE PAUL VI, Pacem in Terris, supra note 172, at ¶ 51 (“[I]f civil
authorities pass laws or command anything opposed to the moral order . . . neither the
laws made nor the authorizations granted can be binding on the consciences of the
citizens.”); id. at ¶ 46 (“[I]f any government does not acknowledge the rights of man
or violates them, it not only fails in its duty, but its orders completely lack juridical
force.”).
351. See, e.g., POPE PAUL VI, Gaudium et Spes, supra note 172, at ¶ 74 (stating
that when political authority is “exercised within the limits of morality and on behalf
of the dynamically conceived common good, according to a juridical order enjoying
legal status . . . citizens are conscience-bound to obey”).
352. See, e.g., POPE PAUL VI, Pacem in Terris, supra note 172, at ¶ 20 (“[T]he
worker has a right to a wage determined according to criterions of justice.”).
353. Bainbridge, CST, supra note 174, at 6.
354. Cf. Clarke & Lyons, supra note 199, at 289 (arguing that the proper
framework for analyzing actions that may not maximize economic return to
shareholder is not “fairness to individual shareholders” but rather “a matter of
justice”); but see King, supra note 306 (arguing that civil disobedience requires
accepting liability).
355. See, e.g., Kinney v. State, 927 P.2d 1289, 1292 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996) (“The
distinction between crimes that are ‘mala prohibita’ and those that are ‘mala in se’ has
not only shaped but, to a certain extent, also bedeviled the law.”).
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might be both considered malum in se and just the sort of action morally
required.356

B. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism requires weighing the estimated benefits of a rule against
the estimated costs.357 One of the costs of any rule that increases the
likelihood that directors will face liability for breach of fiduciary duty is that
it discourages high-quality candidates from taking board positions.358 The
economically-minded utilitarian is also concerned with agency costs.359 A
board directing the corporation to violate the law, especially in regard to a
product as politically charged as firearms (in the Dick’s and Walmart
example), may be acting in furtherance of the directors’ personal beliefs rather
than the best interest of the corporation. But that agency cost must be weighed
against the agency cost of giving monitoring power to shareholders (by
opening the possibility of suit under a per se standard) and against any other
costs associated with a per se rule.360
The per se approach removes some of the control granted to the board
over the corporation and gives it to individual shareholders, not to the
shareholders as a whole. This effectively gives more power to dissident
shareholders.361 Delaware corporation law gives the lion’s share of control
over the corporation not to the shareholders but to the board of directors.362
Shareholders, like judges, “necessarily have less information about the needs
of a particular firm than do that firm’s directors.”363 A permissive rule allows
356. Cf. Pollman, supra note 8, at 744–45 (discussing Hobby Lobby’s challenge
to the Affordable Care Act); see also Ostas, Civil Disobedience, supra note 326, at
299–301 (categorizing prohibitions on hiring undocumented workers as arguably
unjust).
357. Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 770.
358. Strine, supra note 6, at 687 (noting that Caremark recognized just such a
risk).
359. Øyvind Bøhren, The Agent’s Ethics in the Principal-Agent Model, 17 J. BUS.
ETHICS 745, 750 (1998).
360. See id. at 749 (showing agency costs in giving shareholders significant
powers are high).
361. Why expect that dissident shareholders will be an issue? Because they
already are in the context of shareholder proposals. Nickolay Gantchev & Mariassunta
Giannetti, The Costs and Benefits of Shareholder Democracy 1 (Eur. Corp.
Governance Inst. Working Paper No. 586/2018, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/p
apers.cfm?abstract_id=3269378.
362. See, e.g., Bainbridge, Convergence, supra note 11, at 559 (“Delaware case
law consistently indicates a regime of director primacy.” (citations omitted)).
363. Id. at 570 (speaking only vis-à-vis judges).
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directors to be judged not by judges but by presumably more efficient
“Darwinian” market forces.364 That is, shareholders who disapprove of the
board’s actions can vote with their dollars and their feet by selling their
shares.365 That, in turn, pressures directors to avoid such a response.366 The
utilitarian might also point out that shareholders are poorly suited to
monitoring corporate lawbreaking.367
A per se rule is more attractive from a utilitarian perspective if the
various laws that a corporation might violate at the direction of its board are
systematically under penalized.368 Creating liability for the director may be a
more efficient alternative to corporate criminal liability.369 This might be
particularly attractive to the rule-utilitarian. Arguments for and against a per
se rule implicate the tension between rule- and act-utilitarianism.370 The more
complex, and perhaps more interesting, issues arise for the act-utilitarian.
The act-utilitarian might be inclined to view legal risks and costs as just
another cost to be weighed against the benefits of an action. Per Easterbrook
and Fischel, “Managers have no general obligation to avoid violating
regulatory laws, when violations are profitable to the firm, because the
sanctions set by the legislature and courts are a measure of how much firms
should spend to achieve compliance.”371 But even Easterbook and Fischel
added that the same obligation may not extend to acts malum in se.372 Legal
risk should be considered because it is not always clear whether an action
complies with all laws and regulations.373 The utilitarian might respond to

364. See id. at 571 (“While market forces work a sort of Darwinian selection on
corporate decisionmakers, moreover, no such forces constrain judges.” (relying on
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 100 (1991))).
365. See e.g., Yuki Noguchi, MCI Vote Symbolic of Merger Disapproval, WASH.
POST (May 17, 2005), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/2005/05/17
/mci-vote-symbolic-of-merger-disapproval/e0a0336c-c898-482a-849a07f3285edb26/ [perma.cc/WN9U-WKFD].
366. Id.
367. Pollman, supra note 8, at 755–56 (citing DAVID A. WESTBROOK, BETWEEN
CITIZEN AND STATE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CORPORATION 63 (2007)).
368. Id. at 753–54.
369. Id. at 756–57.
370. See LEBACQZ, supra note 85, at 17 (briefly introducing the distinction).
371. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of
Tender Offers, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1168 n.36 (1982).
372. Id.
373. Cf. Sharon Driscoll, Lawyering at the Edge of Innovation: A Conversation
with Kent Walker, Google’s General Counsel and Senior Vice President, STANFORD
LAWYER (Nov. 9, 2016) https://law.stanford.edu/stanford-lawyer/articles/lawyeringat-the-edge-of-innovation-a-conversation-with-kent-walker-googles-general-
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critics arguing that “the legislative intent . . . was not to establish a tariff but
to prohibit certain behavior”374 that the legislature sets the penalties. If the
legislature intends to prevent the behavior altogether, it could have set the
penalties accordingly.
The utilitarian is also much more likely to recognize that corporate
lawbreaking can have informational value by identifying outdated laws and
regulations, conflicting laws, and political and market failures.375 The
utilitarian will also recognize that corporate lawbreaking may have positive
as well negative externalities.376 Not only did Uber drive down prices for car
services, it changed laws that benefited other ride-sharing companies.377
Kellogg’s intransigence regarding cereal labelling rules resulted in regulatory
changes that allowed food companies to better give consumers “information
about food products.”378 Lawbreaking can be an effective strategy to build
grassroots political support for ending rent-seeking through regulation, as in
the case of Uber.379
The utilitarian will likely recognize that the change in policy by Dick’s
and Walmart will have no effect on the market for guns. It affects only a very
small portion of the market (only the market for long guns and only purchases
by eighteen- to twenty-year-olds).380 And that market will continue to be

counsel-and-senior-vice-president/ [perma.cc/Z7AP-2ZYF] (“We do the best we can
to make sure we’re complying with all present and future rules out there, and we’ve
usually gotten it right.”) (emphasis added).
374. John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation and Corporate Governance: An Essay on
Steering Between Schylla and Charybdis, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV.789, 794 n.11
(1984).
375. Pollman, supra note 8, at 731; Tim Wu, Strategic Law Avoidance Using the
Internet: A Short History, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 7, 17 (2017)).
376. See Pollman, supra note 8, at 731–32 (“[T]he benefits that might flow from
corporate disobedience aimed at clarifying or changing the law may accrue to others
where the company pushes for broad legal change beyond an individual regulatory
exemption or waiver.”).
377. Id. at 734–35 (citing Jack Stewart, As Uber Crumbles, Lyft Builds Its Future,
WIRED
(June
14,
2017),
https://www.wired.com/story/uber-lyft-crisis/
[perma.cc/66M9-PPNG]); Ben Thompson, Intel, MobilEye, and Smiling Curves,
STRATECHERY (Mar. 14, 2017), https://stratechery.com/2017/intel-mobileye-andsmiling-curves/ [perma.cc/A4LW-TDLF]; see also Rogers, supra note 262, at 90–91
(listing positive externalities from Uber).
378. See Pollman, supra note 8, at 747.
379. Supra Part IV.
380. Lauren Thomas, Walmart Plans to Dramatically Step Back From
Ammunition Sales After ‘Horrific’ Shootings, CNBC (Sept. 3, 2019),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/03/walmart-plans-to-dramatically-step-back-fromgun-sales-after-horrific-shootings.html [perma.cc/W7FR-6X3S].
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served by any number of sellers.381 So the cost to eighteen- to twenty-yearolds who want to purchase long guns is negligible, while Dick’s and Walmart
employees are left happier because they are no longer engaging in a
transaction they find immoral. Net happiness increases. The problem with
this simple calculus, though, is that neither employees nor shareholders were
polled.382 Many likely take no moral issue with selling long guns to eighteento twenty-year-olds (it didn’t stop them from working there or buying stock
in those companies prior to the policy change, for example), and others likely
find it immoral to refuse to do so.
Act-utilitarianism, at least, counsels against adopting a per se rule for
liability for violations of positive law.383 Absent clear statutory direction,
fiduciary obligation should not be used to bootstrap in additional liability

381. There are more firearm dealers in the United States than McDonald’s
restaurants. Leanna Garfield, There are 50,000 more gun shops than McDonald’s in
the US, BUSINESS INSIDER, Oct. 6, 2017, https://www.businessinsider.com/gundealers-stores-mcdonalds-las-vegas-shooting-2017-10
[perma.cc/Z4ZB-D86C]
(citing BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES, Report of Active
Firearms Licenses – License Type by State Statistics, Sept. 10, 2017,
https://www.atf.gov/firearms/docs/undefined/ffltypebystate09102017pdf/download
[perma.cc/PN6K-JK43]). Excluding Sam’s Club, Walmart operated only 4,177 stores
in the United States as of December 31, 2013. Krystina Gustafson, Time to Close WalMart Stores? Analysts Think So (Jan. 31, 2014), https://www.cnbc.com/2014/01/31/t
ime-to-close-wal-mart-stores-analysts-think-so.html [perma.cc/T6GE-6DT9]. Dick’s
operated just 719 Dick’s Sporting Goods stores, and only 35 Field & Stream stores,
as of October 28, 2017. Victoria Dean, Dick’s Sporting Goods’ Growth Strategy amid
Retail Woes (Jan. 9, 2018), https://marketrealist.com/2018/01/dicks-sporting-slowingstore-expansion?utm_source=yahoo&utm_medium=feed&yptr=yahoo
[perma.cc/P9DL-ZTS4]; but see Nick Morgan, supra note 303 (reporting on similar
policies at other large retailers, including “Bi-Mart, REI, and . . . Kroger”).
382. Mary Pflum and Andrew Kozak, Walmart Employees Call for Walkout Over
Gun
Sales,
NBC
NEWS
(Aug.
7,
2019,
3:22
PM
CDT),
https://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/walmart-employees-call-walkoutover-gun-sales-n1040171 [perma.cc/VRR3-U4PB] (showing that employees
protested because they were not a part of the discussion in Walmart continuing to sell
guns in stores); but see Ryan Bort, Taking Guns Off Shelves May Not Be So Bad for
Business After All, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 23, 2019, 3:20PM),
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/guns-dicks-sporting-goodsprofitable-875761/ [perma.cc/FKJ6-JQPP] (quoting the CEO of Dick’s stating that
shareholders were happy with the decision since there was rise in stock price after the
removal of guns from stores).
383. See Daniel Hunter, Act Utilitarianism and Dynamic Deliberation, 41
ERKENNTNIS 1, 30 (1994) (arguing that act-utilitarianist would prefer a “‘summary’
view of rules” rather than per se liability).
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beyond that provided for violation of the positive law itself.384 The utilitarian
would support a rule that only provides for liability where real harm is shown
to the corporation and that defers to the business judgment of the directors.
Optimally, though, the rule should account for both positive and negative
externalities rather than only harm to the corporation. The utilitarian view
might seem to be that there should not be a special rule for violations of law;
rather, violations of law should be treated the same as any other board act (or
inaction) that might lead to liability for breach of fiduciary duty. But
violations of positive law likely substantially raise the possibility of negative
externalities. Given that, a utilitarian may be open to a tougher standard where
there is a violation of positive law. The appropriate rule would be a variation
on the entire fairness standard – the plaintiff must show that act was net
harmful, considering both benefit and harm to the corporation and positive
and negative externalities (note the burden has been flipped for prudential
reasons).

C. Liberalism
1. Robert Nozick’s Entitlement Theory
The appropriateness of a per se rule can be readily dispensed with under
a Nozickian brand of liberalism. Violations of law as per se breach of
fiduciary duty shifts corporate monitoring from the board and the shareholders
to legislatures, something a Nozickian would view with suspicion from a
practical standpoint.385 A per se rule gives a right to seek recovery to a party
– the corporation, presumably acting through a shareholder derivative suit –
that may not have been injured.386 The per se rule would appear not to require
a showing of an injury to establish a claim, and breach of fiduciary duty allows
for claims not directly tied to an injury.387 Under Nozick’s principle of
compensation, compensation can only be required where an individual’s
rights are violated.388 To require compensation where they are not would
violate the rights of the directors.389
384. Note that this paper is limited to considering the effect of a corporate violation
of law on the fiduciary duties of the board – the relevant actors (including possibly the
corporation) would remain culpable for violating the law itself.
385. NOZICK, supra note 71, at 14 (“Is there really someone who, searching for a
group of wise and sensitive persons to regulate him for his own good, would choose
that group of people who constitute the membership of [a legislature]?”).
386. See supra Part II (discussing that per se liability makes corporations’ lawsuits
easier to bring).
387. Id.
388. NOZICK, supra note 71, at 151.
389. Id. at 153.
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It might be argued that violations of the law infringe on the rights of the
shareholders because the shareholders have only granted the corporation
permission to act within the law. A Nozickian would presumably approve of
(or even demand) shareholders be allowed to bargain for a charter provision
providing for per se liability. It is better to contract for particular paternalistic
limitations on one’s own behavior than “swallow the exact pattern of
restrictions a legislature happens to pass.”390 But they cannot be said to have
voluntarily done so. The ability of the shareholders to set fiduciary liability
standards is sharply limited.391
In Nozick’s view, the state is not entitled to force an individual to
sacrifice for another individual.392 A per se rule forces sacrifice by the
directors – and possibly the corporation and thus the shareholder because a
derivative suit may subtract from, not add to, corporate value – even where
the director has violated the rights of no other individual (making it a sacrifice,
not compensation). Nozick’s vision of a state with legitimacy only to protect
a narrow set of individual rights would seem to counsel against liability for
breach of fiduciary duty for violations of laws that go beyond that, but then it
would counsel against liability for those laws altogether.393 How do we draw
the line, and why draw it in this scenario (fiduciary duty) and not in others?
A per se standard also forces the shareholders to sacrifice their right to
contract for their preferred standard of liability – it is not enough that it might
be for their own good.394 The appropriate standard, then, should be the one
that the shareholders consent to (whether explicitly or implicitly, and whether
within the corporation’s organizational documents). Only if no separate
provision is made should a default rule apply; that default rule must only allow
for liability where the corporation is harmed (negative externalities are
irrelevant to the Nozickian).395

390. Id. at 14.
391. See supra Part II (discussing how exculpation is limited under Section
102(b)(7)).
392. NOZICK, supra note 71, at 33.
393. Id. at 30.
394. See Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 788 (“Nozick also noted that ‘the
state may not use its coercive apparatus for the purpose of getting some citizens to aid
others, or in order to prohibit activities to people for their own good or protection.’”)
(internal quotations omitted).
395. NOZICK, supra note 71, at 30.
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2. John Rawls’ Theory of Justice
Under a Rawlsian brand of liberalism,396 the question is more difficult
but the answer the same. The appropriate standard is difficult to determine
because Rawls focuses on which rules benefit the least well off, and it is
difficult to determine ex ante which standard will benefit the poor.397 It isn’t
as clear as it might seem that a rule making violations of law per se breaches
of fiduciary duties will benefit the poor. For one, any damages go to the
corporation and, indirectly, to its shareholders, a group richer than the average
American in the aggregate,398 as well as plaintiffs’ attorneys, likewise richer.
Two, the violation of law itself may help, not hurt, the poor. Uber may
take away taxi driving jobs heavily populated by the poor, but it provides
driving jobs of its own and it pulls down the price of hiring a driver, to the
benefit of the poor. Uber may also provide safety benefits.399 Setting aside
moral concerns about marijuana, state-legal marijuana businesses give the
poor a low-risk (both in regards to legal risk and risk of violence) vehicle to
choose to partake in marijuana consumption (although increased use of
marijuana may hurt the poor especially).400 If you accept that gun violence
falls hardest on the poor (probable), that Dick’s and Walmart’s policy change
396. This Article focuses on Rawls’ arguments in A THEORY OF JUSTICE. See supra
note 94. It should be noted that Rawls spent considerable effort justifying limits on
civil disobedience in THE JUSTIFICATION FOR CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (1969), but civil
disobedience is not quite the question at which this paper is aimed.
397. Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 766.
398. See, e.g., Danielle Kurtzleben, While Trump Touts Stock Market, Many
Americans Are Left Out of the Conversation, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 1, 2017),
https://www.npr.org/2017/03/01/517975766/while-trump-touts-stock-market-manyamericans-left-out-of-the-conversation [perma.cc/96KF-9T6N] (“As of 2013, the top
10 percent of Americans owned an average of $969,000 in stocks. The next 40 percent
owned $132,000 on average. For the bottom half of families, it was just under
$54,000.”).
399. See Rob Verger, Uber Can Actually Help Prevent Drunk Driving Accidents
– in Some Cities, POPULAR SCI. (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.popsci.com/uber-drunkdriving [perma.cc/AY72-P6SY] (reviewing the literature on Uber’s effects on motor
vehicle crashes and noting that some studies have linked the availability of Uber to a
decline in crashes while some studies have been inconclusive); see also Rogers, supra
note 262, at 92–94 (arguing that any safety concerns are not a long-term issue because
they will be self-correcting).
400. Solomon Israel, Denver Marijuana Farms Make Unwelcome Neighbours,
CBC NEWS (Sept. 29, 2016 5:00AM), https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/denv
er-marijuana-neighbourhoods-1.3761537; Naomi Schaefer Riley, Legalized Pot is
Making America’s Lower Class Poorer and Less Responsible, N.Y. POST (Aug. 20,
2016), https://nypost.com/2016/08/20/legalized-pot-is-making-americas-lower-classpoorer-and-less-responsible/ [perma.cc/RSH5-CKS6].
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will reduce gun access (dubious), and that it will reduce gun violence
(unclear), then it is to the poor’s benefit. Even cheating on overtime and other
employment laws (e.g., mandatory breaks under California state law) could
benefit the poor because such laws artificially depress how much the poor are
able to work and thus how much income they are able to earn.401
Again, this Article is only concerned with the best possible rule for
director liability for breach of fiduciary duty for violations of law. Making a
violation of law also a breach of fiduciary duty adds an additional layer of
potential liability. The relevant actors will always be liable for violating the
law itself as provided for under the law. Under Redish’s gloss on Rawlsian
liberalism,402 that creates an underappreciated problem. Redish advocates a
definition of liberalism that is “on most issues of substantive autonomy . . .
wholly agnostic.”403 That is, the laws of the land control, regardless of the
extent to which they infringe on substantive autonomy, so long as they do not
infringe on process-based autonomy.
But there is a non-obvious process-based autonomy problem with the
per se approach. It adds punishment and deterrence beyond that provided for
by the legislature. The legislature may or may not have carefully calibrated
the punishment and deterrence of the law,404 but it is the body provided
structurally with that authority. For unelected judges to layer on liability
beyond that provided for by the elected branches raises concerns under liberal
theory. This liability includes, presumably, liability for violations of federal
law and the laws of other states and nations – liability for laws that the
Delaware legislature did not pass and has not clearly indicated should provide
a basis for liability. Further, the per se approach takes control over seeking
redress away from the party injured-in-fact and splits it in part between that
party and the shareholders of the corporation. And despite the fact that the
shareholders share claims to the residual earnings of the corporation, the right
to bring a claim will now be available to any shareholder who wants to sue,
including gadflies and activists.
A per se standard may also result in recovery by two parties that may not
have been injured. The first is plaintiffs’ attorneys, who may recover even if

401. Cf.
Jon
Hartley,
FORBES
(May
18,
2016,
2:35PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jonhartley/2016/05/18/new-obama-overtimeregulations-could-harm-tech-startups-and-small-businesses/#368b398d3afc
[perma.cc/97Z4-JBR4] (criticizing expansion of overtime rules due to the
distortionary effect of mandated overtime pay).
402. Supra Part III.b.
403. Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 765.
404. Cf. Coffee, supra note 374, at 794 n.11 (arguing that “the legislature cannot
know how high to set penalty levels in order to make the expected penalty cost exceed
the expected benefit”).
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the shareholders do not.405 The second is the corporation itself. Strine’s per
se formulation does not appear to require a showing of harm.406 Providing for
recovery by a plaintiff when the defendant has not caused injury to the
plaintiff is at odds with “corrective justice.”407 Fiduciary obligation law has
long allowed for recovery even when there is no harm to the entrustor,408 but
that is based on encouraging loyalty by the agent to the entrustor, not to a
third party – whether it be the state, society as a whole, or a discrete group
targeted for protection by the law.
It is simply incorrect to say that “fiduciary duties constrain officers and
directors from ‘impos[ing] their personal moral views on the corporation.’”409
The business judgment rule gives officers and directors enormous discretion
to do just that so long as the acts they direct the corporation to take comply
with the law.410 The relevant question is whether the imposition of moral
views that violate positive law should be treated differently, and dramatically
so, than the imposition of moral views that do not violate positive law. For
the reasons stated above, the imposition of moral views that violate positive
law should not be treated differently under liberal theory. As Pollman
shows,411 individuals “participating in governmental processes and seeking to
influence the decisions of democratic institutions,” 412 while acting through
the corporate form, can cause corporate behavior that skirts the law. Creating
additional liability for that behavior impinges on “the ability of individuals to
405. See Bainbridge, Convergence, supra note 11, at 593 (“The real party in
interest in derivative litigation is the plaintiff’s attorney, not the nominal shareholderplaintiff. In most cases, the bulk of any monetary benefits go to the plaintiffs’ lawyers
rather than the corporation or its shareholders.”). Prior to In re Trulia, Inc.
Stockholder Litigation, it was common for merger objection lawsuits to end with
“disclosure-only settlements,” under which only the attorneys recovered. 129 A.3d
884 (Del. Ch. 2016). A similar problem arises in the class action context.
406. Strine, supra note 6, at 650.
407. Christopher J. Robinette, Torts Rationales, Pluralism, and Isaiah Berlin, 14
GEO. MASON L. REV. 329, 352 (2007).
408. See, e.g., Lum v. McEwen, 57 N.W. 662, 662–63 (Minn. 1894) (“Actual
injury is not the principle the law proceeds on, in holding such transactions void.
Fidelity in the agent is what is aimed at . . . . It is not material that no actual injury to
the company [principal] resulted.”)
409. Pollman, supra note 8, at 762 (quoting Jill Fisch, The “Bad Man” Goes to
Washington: The Effect of Political Influence on Corporate Duty, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1593, 1603 (2006)).
410. Arsht, supra note 13, at 129–30.
411. See Pollman, supra note 8, at 742–48 (discussing general business lobbying
and corporations skirting the law to assert moral stances).
412. Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 767; but see RAWLS, supra note 94, at
321 (“[I]t goes without saying that civil disobedience cannot be grounded solely on
group or self-interest.”).
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control the nature of their participation in the processes of collective
democratic government.”413
A per se rule then cannot be reconciled with the liberalism of either
Nozick or Rawls. A liberal theory of fiduciary obligation demands harm to
the corporation be shown as a predicate for breach of fiduciary duty, even
where the board directed the corporation to violate positive law.414 Under a
Rawlsian-Redishian view, it also demands a clear indication by the legislature
in the state of incorporation that the intent of the law is to co-opt the laws of
other jurisdictions. The Delaware legislature has not clearly done so.415 The
appropriate standard as it stands today, then, is to treat a violation of positive
law no differently than any other corporate decision. The business judgment
rule will apply unless there was an interested transaction. A tougher standard
would require the Delaware legislature to act.

VI. CONCLUSION
It might seem rare that a board will direct the corporation to violate the
law. Uber’s regulatory strategy and the decisions by Walmart and Dick’s
Sporting Goods to not sell long guns to eighteen- to twenty-year-olds may
appear anomalous.
They are not anomalous simply because corporations rarely violate the
law. Rather, they may be anomalous simply because corporate boards rarely
direct the corporation to do anything. The primary function of the board is
supervisory.416 And virtually all of the decisions asserting that violations of
law are per se bad faith were written by Chief Justice Strine. There are
obvious parallels to the “so-called triad” of good faith, care, and loyalty that

413. Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 765.
414. See generally MILL, supra note 90.
415. See supra Part II (discussing the lack of clarity in the law in this area). The
Rawlsian-Redishian view stands in a certain tension with the Delaware General
Assembly’s basic approach to corporation law. Rather than make direct provision for
entity governance or allow the investors free rein to structure entity governance, as
with limited liability companies and limited partnerships, Delaware corporation law
allows the Court of Chancery to retain in significant part its traditional equitable role
in shaping fiduciary law. See, e.g., In re Oxbow Carbon LLC Unitholder Litig., No.
12447-VCL, slip op. at 4–27 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 2018) (discussing the court’s equitable
powers at length).
416. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 34, at 1494 (noting that boards mostly
supervise management, “punctuated only occasionally by a discrete transactional
decision,” rather than take “affirmative action on individual matters”).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020

65

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 5

66

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

largely only existed within decisions written by then-Justice Holland,417 but
Strine is an enormously influential figure in the continuing development of
Delaware law. Doctrinal uncertainty may continue due to the “cycling
phenomenon.”418
There are practical implications. Entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ lawyers are
always on the hunt for the next viable theory of liability against corporate
directors, after all.419 Recent changes in Delaware caselaw that make
shareholder suits harder to win provide a particular incentive for
entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ lawyers to seek new vehicles for shareholder
suits.420 A per se standard might prove lucrative – it opens up liability for
losses normally insulated by the business judgment rule. If Nike loses market
share because it made Colin Kaepernick the face of a large marketing
campaign, shareholders cannot successfully sue because that decision is
protected by the business judgment rule.421 But if Dick’s Sporting Goods

417. See Bainbridge, Convergence, supra note 11, at 566 (discussing the nearexclusive presence of the term in Justice Holland’s opinions and evidence of
skepticism by other jurists).
418. See id. at 566 n.36 (discussing how the Delaware Supreme Court’s unanimity
norm leads to Delaware corporation law cycling between different doctrinal
approaches).
419. “M&A objection class actions . . . replaced traditional stock drop cases as the
lawsuit of choice for plaintiff’s attorneys” a decade ago. Jennifer J. Johnson, Securities
Class Actions in State Court, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 349, 384 (2011). More recently, the
“Delaware Chancery court’s 2016 decision in the Trulia case” pushed the percentage
of M&A deals challenged in federal court from 26 to 96%. Kevin LaCroix, Percentage
of 2018 Deals Drawing Merger Objection Suits Held Steady, THE D&O DIARY (Sept.
17,
2019),
https://www.dandodiary.com/2019/09/articles/mergerlitigation/percentage-of-2018-deals-drawing-merger-objection-suits-held-steady/
[perma.cc/SZL3-VH2M]. In other circumstances, plaintiffs’ lawyers have been
likened to the moles in the Whac-a-Mole game – tightening standards for liability in
one area incentivizes plaintiffs’ lawyers to alter the suits they bring. Howard M.
Erichson, Cafa’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1593, 1607
(2008).
420. Cf. Alison Frankel, Star Shareholders’ Lawyer Stuart Grant is Quitting His
Practice: ‘I Don’t Like Losing’, REUTERS (June 25, 2018, 12:28PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-grant/star-shareholders-lawyer-stuart-grantis-quitting-his-practice-i-dont-like-losing-idUSKBN1JL26J [perma.cc/P7FF-F7BD]
(reporting on a prominent shareholders’ lawyer leaving his firm to move into the
litigation finance space because he went from winning “90 to 95 percent of our cases”
to having “probably lost more than we’ve won,” concluding that “it’s almost
impossible to challenge a deal in Delaware” and “the courthouse doors are effectively
closed.”).
421. Joshua Fershee, Nike’s Kaepernick Ad Is the Most Business Judgmenty Thing
Ever,
BUS.
LAW
PROF
BLOG
(Sept.
13,
2018),
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loses market share because it stops selling long guns to eighteen- to twentyyear-olds, shareholders presumably can sue and recover based on that market
share, even though civil liability for violating state bars on age discrimination
may be negligible.
There are also practical implications for corporate decision-making.
One of the goals of corporate governance law is to encourage boards to stay
informed and monitor management.422 The wide disparity in the plaintifffriendly per se standard for a direct violation of law versus the tough standard
for a failure to monitor compliance offers a perverse incentive for boards to
avoid reviewing decisions that might violate the law. Another concern is that
it allows not just shareholders but dissident shareholders to potentially usurp
the role of the board.423 Given the availability of equitable relief, a dissident
shareholder could sue Dick’s or Walmart to force it to reverse its policy
decision to stop selling long guns to eighteen- to twenty-year-olds.
But the real importance of debating the issue may be the light it sheds on
more fundamental issues of the role of the corporation, the law, and the
individual in society. Starkly different views lead to divergent opinions of
what the rules that govern society should be. The five models discussed lead
to five different approaches.424 But only the populist communitarian model
lends support to what appears to be the current per se standard.425
How, then, should we handle divergent results? Isn’t it true that
divergent results force us to choose the theory we prize most highly?426 One
way to handle divergent results is by applying a presumption.427 I offer three
presumptions. One, given that only one of five models supports the per se
standard, there should be a presumption against that standard. Two, given the
lack of clarity in the statutory law and caselaw428 and given the divergent
results reached by applying our five models of political theory,429 there should
be a presumption against applying a rule that stands in such sharp contrast
with the rules applied in other, similar situations. There should be a
presumption against a per se standard of liability for violations of positive law
https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2018/09/nikes-kaepernick-ad-isthe-most-business-judgmenty-thing-ever.html [perma.cc/SP46-4MH2].
422. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch.
1996).
423. Gantchev & Giannetti, supra note 361.
424. Supra Part V.A–C.
425. Supra Part V.A.1.
426. See Barnett, supra note 74, at 165 (noting an objection to his these regarding
the virtues of redundant methods of analysis).
427. See id. at 166 (“We normally handle unyielding conflicts by adopting an
operative presumption.”).
428. Supra Part II.
429. Supra Part V.
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because it is a much harsher rule than applies to conduct covered by the
business judgment rule or entire fairness.430 Three, given the same two
conditions noted above, the standard should be set by the legislature, not by
the courts. Weighing political theory models necessarily requires value
judgments of the sort that are rightly the province of representative, elected
legislatures.
This perhaps gives the game away by embracing the proceduralism of
Rawslian-Redishian liberalism, but it is also a communitarian approach (if not
the exact approach taken by populist communitarianism or CST) because it
puts the power to set the standard in the hands of a duly-elected legislature.
The legislature is likely to weigh like against like and set a rule that only
allows for liability where the corporation itself is harmed. Simply subsuming
violations of positive law into the business judgment rule and entire fairness
is an attractive option. But the legislature would be justified in a tighter rule
that recognizes violations of positive law are more likely to lead to harm than
normal business decisions. Once the plaintiff has shown a violation of
positive law, the burden shifts to the defendants to show that there was no
harm to the corporation. That is likely to partially satisfy the Nozickian liberal
(as much as is possible in the non-minimal state)431 and the utilitarian.432
Dispensing with a per se rule in favor of treating violations of positive
law like any other board action would not only be efficient but would comport
with the liberal values that underlie our republic. It also recognizes that
fiduciary obligation law is not Superman, crisscrossing the nation in flight
searching for wrongs to right. Fiduciary obligation law is calibrated to address
a very specific set of wrongs and inefficiencies, and it is poorly suited to serve
as a general purpose cure-all. To the extent that the underlying violations of
positive law are underpenalized, the solution is for the appropriate legislature
430. This is troubling in significant part because it appears to create a stark divide
in the treatment of similar acts. It would be less troubling were the Delaware courts
to embrace a more searching analysis of where the directors were in fact attempting
to act in the corporation’s best interest, and thus the business judgment rule will
insulate their conduct, even if their business judgement was in fact terrible, and where
the directors were not acting in the corporation’s best interest, and thus the business
judgment rule would not apply at all, because they were not acting in good faith. This
extends beyond violations of law. A tweet by Elon Musk that appeared to taunt the
SEC might qualify as such. Jonathan Stemple, Tesla’s Musk Mocks SEC as Judge
Demands They Justify Fraud Settlement, REUTERS (Oct. 4, 2018, 1:57PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tesla-musk-sec/teslas-musk-mocks-sec-as-judgedemands-they-justify-fraud-settlement-idUSKCN1ME2CC [perma.cc/HJX9-6PY4].
431. Cabining how liability for breach of fiduciary duty can be consensually
tailored will continue to be an issue. The Delaware legislature might choose to
continue to loosen those rules, however.
432. The insistence that some things are rightfully the province of the legislature
will continue to stick in the craw of the Posnerians.
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to recalibrate the underlying law, not to draft fiduciary obligation law to do
work it is not designed to do or adept at doing.
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